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COMMERCE REGULATION BEFORE GIBBONS
V. OGDEN: INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION
FACILITIES
ALBERT S. ABEL*
It is one thing to accede to the proposition of Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes that "the Constitution is what the judges say it is"' and to his
other observation, addressed specifically to the Commerce Clause, that
"It is to Marshall that we turn for the description of the power con-
fided to Congress and its scope." 2  It is quite another to believe that
the clause was authored by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in 1824 in Wash-
ington. Nor, despite recent scholarly squintings in that direction,3 does
it seem wholly safe to trust to Marshall's exposition as an embodiment
of prior popular or professional understanding of the law. However
greatly deserved may be the eulogies of his statesmanship and prevision,
there is little basis for ascribing to him pre-eminence in the qualities
either of legal erudition or of nice responsiveness to the mind and tem-
per of his time.
Between 1787, when the Constitution was drafted, and 1824, when
Gibbons v. Ogden4 was decided, no Supreme Court decision and com-
paratively few5 state or lower federal court cases had adverted to the
Commerce Clause; yet it would be fantastic to say that there was, for
* B.A., J.D., State University of Iowa; L.L.M., Harvard University; Professor
of Law, West Virginia University.
I HUGHES, ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES (2d. ed. 1916)
185.2 HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1928) 143.
'See, e.g., Stem, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy (1946) 59
HARv. L. REv. 648.
9 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1824).
At a comparatively late period there was the numerous family of cases, all
growing out of the controversy disposed of by Gibbons v. Ogden, comprising
Gibbons v. Ogden, 6 Wheat. 448 (U. S. 1821) ; Sullivan v. Fulton Steam Boat Co.,
6 Wheat. 450 (U. S. 1821) (both disposed of on procedural grounds) ; Gibbons v.
Ogden, 6 N. J. Law 285 (1822) ; Gibbons v. Livingston, 6 N. J. Law 236 (1822) ;
Gibbons v. Ogden, 17 Johns. 488 (N. Y. 1820) ; Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch.
174 (N. Y. 1819); Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. 150 (N. Y. 1819); Livingston
v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. 94 (N. Y. 1819); in the Matter of Vanderbilt, 4 Johns.
Ch. 57 (N. Y. 1819) ; Livingston v. Ogden, 4 Johns. Ch. 48 (N. Y. 1819). Aside
from these, there were only seven cases reported which involved a discussion of
the Commerce Clause; namely, Elkinson v. Deliessline, 8 Fed. Cas. 493, No. 4, 366(Dist. S. C. 1823); The Wilson v. U. S., 30 Fed. Cas. 239, No. 17,846 (Dist. Va.
1820) ; U. S. v. The Brigantine William, 28 Fed. Cas. 614, No. 16,700 (Dist. Mass.
1808); State v. New Orleans Navigation Co., 11 Mart. 309 (La. 1822); Living-
ston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507 (N. Y. 1812) ; City Council of Charleston v. Rog-
ers, 2 McCord 495, 13 Am. D. 751 (S. C. 1823); Ex parte Pool, 2 Va. Cas. 276
(1821).
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that considerable portion of our nation's history, no law as to the ap-
propriate or permissible areas of state and federal action, respectively,
in regulating economic enterprise. After all, the words were there in
the Constitution. By presumption, the fathers must have contemplated
that their inclusion made some law; and, by demonstration, it can be
established with tolerable precision what they thought that law was.0 A
strong argument can be and has been made against resorting to such
contemporary materials or to those of the period immediately following
adoption to aid in present-day application of the Constitution.7 Others
may find more congenial the approach of Mr. Justice McLean's obiter
an even half century after the Constitutional Convention that "A uni-
form course of action, involving the right to the exercise of an impor-
tant power by the state governments, for half a century; and this
almost without question; is no unsatisfactory evidence that the power
is rightfully exercised." s More cautious spirits, with whom the writer
enlists pro hac vice and without prejudice, may feel that, regardless of
whether the judicial cat should or should not jump in the direction indi-
cated by prior governmental action of the other branches and by public
discussion and granting that the direction in which it does jump deter-
mines the position of the law when the leap is completed, before it stirs
to action the law is what the most authoritative and numerous evidences
of it then existing indicate. Even Supreme Court doctrines, it is now
clear, are not immortal; yet they are law while they last. So, one may
venture to suppose, legislative and executive action, even if less in dig-
nity and not to be regarded by the Court when it makes its choice,0 is
better as a guide to the Constitution's contemporary content than the
late-begotten definitions and deductions of even the strongest justices.
Upon that assumption this study has been made. It is a simple
effort to learn what the content of the commerce clause was at the
earliest stage of the republic's existence and expresses no judgment as
to what the law should now be. Its method is largely archaeological-
an endeavor to pierce through that rich mosaic of rhetoric, the Marshall
opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, to reach and sift the dusty deposits of
early statute law buried beneath it.10 Each reader may draw his own
' The question is fully discussed in Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Con-
stitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment (1941) 25 MixNN. L. REV.
432. But cf. HAmILTON AND ADAm, THE POWER To GOVERN (1937).
"Ten Broek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in
Constitutional Construction (1938) 26 CALIF. L. REv. 287, 437, 664; (1939) 27
CALIF. L. Rxv. 157, 399.
'See Briscoe v. The Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257, 318 (U. S. 1837).
' Indications exist, however, that statutes may be attaining a more considerable
status as a source of law; see, e.g., United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219
(1941) ; Stone, The Common Law in the United States (1936) 50 HARv. L. Rxv. 4.
"0 For federal legislation, the materials used are derived from an examination
and digest of the contents of the first three volumes of the Statutes at Large, com-
prising the public laws for the period 1789-1823, also of the private laws for the
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conclusions as to the significance of the materials found for present
purposes in the light of his personal notions of continuity and change.
A decent regard for the limits on the space of the North Carolina
Law Review and for the limits on the time of its readers forbids an
over-all treatment. The exemplar selected, regulation of interstate trans-
portation facilities, is reasonably representative. Under this head it is
proposed to discuss the establishment, disestablishment, and co-ordina-
tion of interstate transportation routes, their construction, maintenance,
and repair, condition and character, the adjustment of competing claims
of patrons to their use, the equipment and manner of operation of the
same period, reprinted in the sixth volume. The various state laws serving as a
basis of discussion do not cover a precisely identical period because of variations
in dates of publication. While completeness of reference would have required
examination of all session laws throughout the period covered, the writer has been
content to rely on codes or digests of the statutes published at approximately the
date of Gibbons v. Ogden; some of these appeared slightly before and others
slightly after that decision, thus occasioning the variations referred to, but no
materials later than the end of that decade have been used. It is believed that this
gives a substantially accurate picture of the state of the law at the time. Where
the information was disclosed in the source consulted, the date of original enact-
ment is made to appear parenthetically in connection with each statute cited. In
most cases, statutes merely continuing or altering in unimportant particulars the
prior basic statutes are not cited, the same being true as to federal legislation, with
a very occasional exception where extraordinary intervening circumstances, such
as the adoption of the United States Constitution or admission of a territory to
statehood, seemed to afford a special reason why particular notice should be taken
of the continuing life of the statute. Private acts have not been exhaustively
referred to, only such representative instances being cited as would suffice to show
the prevalence of state regulation of a particular subject or in a particular manner.
Where no digest or code of the period in question was available, the materials have
been drawn from session laws either wholly or for such time as would bring the
statutes down to 1825. Specifically, the following sources have been examined and
digested: ToULmIN DIG. LAWS ALA. (1823); PUB. STAT. CONN. 1824; Rxv. STAT.
DEL. 1829; PRiNcE's DIG. LAWS GA. (1819); FoSTER DIG. LAWS GA. 1820-1829;
SEss. LAWS IL. Tmuz. 1812, 1813, 1814, 1816-7, 1817-8; ILL. LAWS 1819, 1820-1,
1822-3, 1824; LAWS INDIANA Tmun (ed. Philbrick) 1801-9; LAws INDIANA TEMA.
(ed. Ewbank & Piker) 1809-16; INDIANA AcTs 1817-8; LAWS IND. 1818-9, 1819,
1821, 1822, 1823 (special acts only), 1825; MooanEAD & BROWN, DIG. STAT. LAWS
Ky. 1834 (only materials to 1824 used); DIG. LA. Acrs 1804-27; REv. LAWS ME.
1821; LAvs MD. 1692-1839 (ed. Dorsey) (only materials to 1826 used); MASS.
LAWS 1780-1807; MASS. LAWS 1807-16; SEss. LAWS MASS. May 1816, May 1817,
Jan. 1818, Jan. 1819, May 1819, Jan. 1820, Jan. 1822; REv. CODE Miss. 1824; LAWS
OF DIST. & TERE. LA. and Trai. & STATE Mo. (1842 ed.), volume 1, 1804-24; Comp.
LAWs N. H. 1830; REv. LAWS N. J. 1820; CoMP. PUB. LAWS N. J. 1833 (only
materials to 1829 used); REv. STAT. N. Y. 1827-8; N. C. Rlv. LAwS 1821; id.
TAYLOR'S REVIsAL 1821-5; LAws OHIO 1820, 1822; S~ss. AcTs OHIO (general
acts) 1822, 1825, 1826, 1827 (local/acts) 1822, 1824, 1825, 1826, 1827; PA. LAWS
1700-1825; R. I. REv. LAWS 1822; BREvARD DIG. PUB. STAT. LAWS S. C.; 6
McCoRD STATUTES AT LARGE S. C.; LAWS TENN. (ed. Scott) 1820; ComP. LAWS
VT. 1824; REv. CODE VA. 1819; REv. CODE VA. Supp. 1833 (only materials to
1829 used). As regards exhaustiveness of citation, an attempt has been made to
refer to every sort of state action in the field, disclosed by the authorities con-
sulted; but where a given type of act recurred in the statute books of many of
the states and often recurred frequently in the same state, the writer has exercised
a prerogative of selection and has only cited illustrative examples of what was
being done. Little would be gained by listing every instance in which the states,
for example, declared a particular stream navigable. In general, the more con-
spicuous the interstate aspect of the regulation, the greater has been the reluctance
to exclude.
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vehicles and vessels of common and contract carriers, and incidental
provisions with reference to ownership of and encumbrances on such
vehicles and vessels-several of these items being, as the reader will
have observed, among the major problems nowadays confided to the
Interstate Commerce Commission.
1. LOCATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF LAND RoumS
The states engaged actively in the project of affording facilities for
land transportation. In a more advanced state of development, when
the existence of a network of highways virtually linking every com-
munity in the nation with every other was taken for granted, local in-
terests were to cease agitating for mere roads and were to clamor instead
for rail connections with the world outside; but the prototype of the
late nineteenth-century urge to be a railhead was the early nineteenth-
century wish to be a "roadhead." The problems surrounding the estab-
lishment and discontinuance of rail service and rail connections are
modernized descendants of a pioneer forebear, the question of the routes
and termini of highways. It is against this institutional perspective that
the early attitudes and practices as to the establishment and location of
highways are to be viewed.1 '
The same circumstantial variations were present, of course, in this
early proliferation of highways as were thereafter manifested in con-
nection with the extension of the rail system. The bulk of the legislative
effort was devoted to the establishment of interior roads from one point
to another within the same state; and, while no doubt many even
of these facilitated communication with exterior points, it would be
perhaps impossible and certainly not worth the effort involved at this
late date to explore their place in the larger pattern of the evolving
highway system. Again, general highway statutes were adopted in
many states12 containing a prescription of procedures for laying out
and erecting public roads. These would seem to comprehend, yet they
did not focus distinctly upon, road projects not limited to purely local
and internal objects; and, accordingly, they need only be noted in pass-
" Road, bridge, and ferry legislation seems to have constituted one of the most
considerable tasks of the state legislatures in the period under consideration. See
e.g., BREvAxRs DI;. PuR. STAr. LAWS S. C., where Title 19, on Roads, Ferries,
and Bridges is the longest in the whole digest, occupying 163 pages and comprising
793 sections. The situation in other states seems to have been similar. Under the
circumstances the statutory citations in this connection do not profess to be ex-
haustive but merely to give.a fair sampling of legislative activity on the subject.
"UE.g., TOULMIN'S DIG. LAWS ALA. (1823) 391 (Dec. 21, 1820); PRINcE's
DIG. LAWS GA. (1820-9) 294 (Dec. 4, 1799); LAWS INDIANA TERR. 1801-9 (ed.
Philbrick) 427 (Sept. 17, 1807) ; MOREHEAD & BROWN DIG. STAr. LAws Ky., title
154 (Feb. 25, 1797); 2 RFV. LAWS ME. (1821) 509; 1 LAWS MD. 1692-1839 (ed.
Dorsey) 4 (1704); REv. CODE Miss. (1824) 350; 1 N. C. Rav. LAws (1821) 515(1784) ; OHIo LAws (1820) 193; 3 PA. LAWS (1791-1802) 512 (April 6, 1802)
f LAWS TENN. 1820 (ed. Scott) 568 (April 20, 1796) ; id., 656 (Oct. 26, 1799);
Comp. LAWS VT. (1824) 427 (Mar. 3, 1797).
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ing, as inferentially supporting the conclusions as to state power in the
field to be drawn from still a third class of statutes.
That class consisted of those whose terms, alone or in the light of
an elementary knowledge of geography, had reference to an artery of
interstate or international communication. Sometimes they provided for
laying out or establishing public highways to points on the state line' 3
or to seaports or other centers of water transportation on the borders
of the state' 4 or between such points. 15 Sometimes they looked to the
establishment of important feeder roads within the state intersecting
already existing interstate trunk roads16 or connecting with interstate
13 TouLmnl's DIG. LAWS ALA. (1823) 390 (Georgia line, Dec. 4, 1819); Fos-
raa's DIG. LAWS GA. (1820-9) 294 (from the Altamaha to the Florida line, Dec.
23, 1822) ; Ill. Laws 1822-3, p. 123 (from interior Illinois points to points on the
Wabash and the Mississippi rivers) ; Ind. Laws 1819, p. 96; Ind. Laws 1821, p.
152; Ind. Laws 1825, p. 82 (from Terre Haute to the Illinois line in the direction
of Vandalia); 2 N. C. REy. LAWS (1821) 1497 (Waynesville to the southern line
of the state, 1819) ; id., 1544( Tennessee line, 1820) ; TAYLOR'S REVISAL N. C. LAWS
(1821-5) 80 (same, 1822) ; Ohio Sess. Acts, 1st Sess. 1821, p. 68 (interior points
to Marietta) ; id. p. 158 (to Indiana line) ; Ohio Local Acts, 1st Sess. 1822, p. 54
(schedule of numerous roads, some running to the state line); Ohio Local Acts,
1st Sess. 1824, p. 80 (interior points to East (?) Liverpool); Ohio Local Acts
1st Sess. 1826, p. 89 (schedule of numerous roads, some running to the state line) ;
2 PA. LAWS (1780-91) 442 (from the mouth of the Tioga River to the New York
State line, Mar. 28, 1788); 3 PA. LAWS (1791-1802) 24, April 13, 1791; id. 375
(interior points to New York line,. April 8, 1799) ; 4 PA. LAWS (1802-8) 532 (in-
terior points to Ohio line, Mar. 28, 1808); 5 PA. LAWS (1809-12) 35 (interior
points to Maryland line, Mar. 22, 1809) ; id. 183 (from Washington to the Vir-
ginia line in the direction of Wheeling, Mar. 20, 1810); 1 LAWS TENN. 1820 (ed.
Scott) 827 (road to Georgia, Aug. 4. 1804) ; ef. 1 MAss. LAws (1780-1807) 97
(repair of highway leading to New Hampshire, June 16, 1783) ; TAro'S REVISAL
N. C. LAWS (1821-5) 118 (repair of highway leading to the Virginia line, 1823);
8 PA. LAws (1822-5) 42 (interior point to Ohio line, Feb. 27, 1823); 2 Comp.
LAWS VT. (1807) 215 (Mar. 8, 1784); 1 LAWS TENNr. 1820 (ed. Scott) 967
(specifying a number of roads, including one from an interior Tennessee point to
the neighborhood of Muscle Shoals) and statutes cited infra note 14.
"I ToumIm's DIG. LAWS ALA. (1823) 410 (from interior Alabama points to
Pensacola, Dec. 17, 1821) ; Ill. Laws 1824, p. 22 (interior Illinois points to inter-
state ferry across the Mississippi River) ; Ohio Local Acts, 1st Sess. 1824 (in-
terior town to Cincinnati) ; Ohio Local Acts, 1st Sess. 1825, p. 89 (interior points
to Ohio River opposite Wheeling); 3 BaavARn DIG. Pun. STAT. LAWS S. C. 362
(road to Savannah River ferry, 1784) ; id. 368 (Edisto to the ferry landing oppo-
site Augusta, Georgia, 1786); id. 385 (interior points to Savannah River bridge,
1792) ; id. 392 (same to Savannah River ferry, 1795) ; cf. id. 348 (repairs, interior
points to Savannah River ferry landing opposite Augusta, Georgia, 1770) ; id. 353
(repairs, interior point to Savannah River, 1777).11 ToumIm's DIG. LAWS ALA. (1823) 441 (Mobile to the Mississippi state
line, Dec. 31, 1822); Ohio Local Acts, 1st Sess. 1825, p. 24 (Cleveland to the
Pennsylvania line).11 ToTimanN's DIG. LAWS ALA. (1823) 388 (between the falls of the Tuscaloosa
and the great military road from Columbia, Tennessee, to Madisonville, Louisiana,
Dec. 16, 1819); 2 N. C. REv. LAWS (1821) 1546 (from Burke County through
Asheville to the through road to the south line of the state, 1820) ; Ohio Local
Acts, 1st Sess. 1826, p. 33 (Steubenville to the National, or Cumberland, Road) ;
cf. Ohio Local Acts, 1st Sess. 1827, p. 48 (law for laying out a number of specified
roads, including some on canals connecting with exterior waterways); 1 TENN.
LAWS 1820 (ed. Scott) 967 (specifying a number of local roads, including one to
intersect "the Georgia road," Sept. 13, 1806).
1947]
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waterways flowing through the state.17 Sometimes it was specifically
noted that such roads, on reaching the state line, would there connect
with a like road established by the adjoining state on the other side
of the line.'8
Nor was the state's power limited to or exhausted by the initial
erection of a highway communication between an interior and an ex-
terior point. Leaving the termini unaffected, legislation might provide
for changes in the intermediate routing so as to result in the elimination
of circuity or similar interferences to ready intercourse between them.10
Moreover, the state legislatures, when they thought fit, in view of supe-
rior alternative routes or on other considerations, vacated highways
communicating with other states.2°
Occasionally it would appear two states participated in the establish-
ment of a public highway project to serve as a line of communication
between them.21
At this period, the furnishing of the transportation service involved
in the construction and maintenance of highway facilities was not con-
ceived of as peculiarly or especially a governmental enterprise. It still
remained a fruitful field for private investment and development. The
numerous state railroad franchises of a later era were anticipated by
the frequent turnpike franchises in the period under consideration. The
same variety of particulars was to be found among these private trans-
portation systems 'as has already been noted in connection with the
public highways. There was the same interspersion, among franchises
relating exclusively to interior turnpikes and general laws applying in-
differently to those and others,2 2 of franchises for turnpikes extending
to state lines23 (where, it was sometimes specifically noted in the statute,
172 DIG. LA. AcTs (1804-27) 322 (from roads in the parish of West Baton
Rouge to the Mississippi River, Feb. 19, 1825).18 3 BmARvAs DIG. PuB. STAT LAWS S. C. 419 (joining an interior road with
the public road from Rockingham, North Carolina, at the state border, 1796) ; ef.
1 LAws TENN. 1820 (ed. Scott) 827 (Aug. 4, 1804).
19 See TouLmIN's DIG. LAWS ALA. (1823) 422 (commissioners appointed to lay
out a road "in such a manner as to shorten the distance to the settlements in
Georgia," Dec. 3, 1821); REv. STAT. DEL. (1829) 649 (straightening 'a road be-
tween a shore point in Delaware and the Maryland line, Feb. 2, 1793) ; Ohio Local
Acts, 1st Sess. 1827, p. 5 (altering a state road leading from Portsmouth, Ohio,
to Vanceburgh, Kentucky); cf. 2 REy. LAWS ME. (1821) 509 (alteration pro-
visions in general road laws) ; 2 N. C. Rav. LAws (1821) 1545 (appointing com-
missioners to review part of a state road in Ashe County, 1820) ; Ohio Local Acts,
1st Sess. 1825, p. 31 (authorizing Hamilton County to alter and amend a state
road from an interior point to Cincinnati).
20 For typical examples from one state, see REv. STAT. DEL. (1829) 652 (Jan.
29, 1801, Jan. 20, 1815, Jan. 15, 1818).
I 1 LAWS TENN. 1820 (ed. Scott) 827 (authorizing the marking of a road "be-
tween this state and Georgia agreeably to treaty," Aug. 4, 1804).
"See, e.g., PB. STAT. CONN. (1824) 427; 2 Rav. LAWS ME. (1821) 599; 3
MASS. LAWS (1780-1807) 285 (Mar. 16, 1805).
"TouLmI.N's DIG. LAWS ALA. (1823) 426 (Dec. 30, 1822); RaV. STAT. DEL.(1829) 520 (Feb. 1, 1808); id. 530 (Jan. 21, 1811); id. 531 (Jan. 23, 1811); id.
[Vol. 25
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they were to join a like improvement constructed within and under
authority from the contiguous state), 4 for turnpikes intersecting within
the state established interstate arteries of land travel,25 connecting with
ferry landings on the banks of boundary rivers, 26 or connecting interior
points with seaports or shipping centers 2 7
Toward the end of the period, there were occasional grants, anal-
ogous to those just mentioned, for the construction of a new and im-
proved facility, the railroad.28
On occasion, those licensed by a neighboring state to construct a
turnpike extending up to the state line were even authorized to project
their road across the state line so as to reach a community located within
the enacting state or a company was granted the privilege of establish-
ing a road to run between points in two different states,30 in which case,
it would seem, the assent of the other state was requisite to the full
establishment of the project 31
536 (Jan. 1, 1813); id. 537 (Jan. 28, 1813); id. 538 (April 14, 1813); Ill. Laws
1819, p. 116; Ill. Laws 1824, p. 88; 2 MAss. LAWS (1780-1807) 928 (Mar. 4,
1800); TAYI.OR'S REvIsAL N. C. REv. LAWS (1821-5) 111 (1823); id. 149 (1824);
4-PA. LAWS (1802-8) 7 (Feb. 11, 1803); id. 141 Mar. 5, 1804); id. 340 (Mar.
28, 1806) ; id. 359 (road crossing the state from the New Jersey line to the New
York line, Jan. 26, 1807) ; id. 388 (Mar. 31, 1807) ; id. 395 (April 7, 1807) ; id.
405 (same date); id. 491 (Feb. 22, 1808); 5 PA. LAWS (1809-12) 280 (Jan. 17,
1812) ; 1 TENx. LAWS 1820 (ed. Scott) 882 (Nov. 2, 1805) ; 2 id. 121 (Oct. 28,
1813); 2 id. 225 (1815); cf. 1 TENN. LAws 1820 (ed. Scott) 865 (segments
within the state of the road leading from North Carolina and Virginia to Ken-
tucky, Nov. 2, 1805) ; 2 Comp. LAWS VT. (1807) 247 (Oct. 27, 1795).S"R v. STAT. DFi. (1829) 520 (connecting with Pennsylvania road at state
line, Feb. 1, 1808).2 TOULMIN'S DIG. LAWS ALA. (1823) 435 (intersecting the road fronq Nash-
ville to New Orleans, Dec. 26, 1822).
"Ill. Laws 1820-21, p. 94; 4 PA. LAWS (1802-8) 27 (Mar. 24, 1803); cf. 2
PA. LAWS (1780-91) 332 (Sept. 6, 1785).
IT 5 Lrrr. (Ky.) 519 (Lexington to Louisville, 1817) ; Ky. Sess. Acts 1818, p.
493 (Portland to Louisville); iid. (Shippingport to Louisville) ; 1 DIG. LA. AcTS
(1804-27) 275 (Lake Pontchartrain to the Mississippi River); 3 MASS. LAWS
(1780-1807) 102 (Augusta to Wiscasset, Feb. 22, 1803); id. 201 (Taunton to New
Bedford, Mar. 3, 1804); id. 365 (Taunton to South Boston, June 23, 1806); 3
PA. LAWS (1791-1802) 82 (Lancaster to Philadelphia, April 9, 1792) ; 4 PA. LAWS
(1802-8) 124 (Waterford to Erie, Feb. 13, 1804) ; cf. 1 DIG. LA. AcTs (1804-27)
258 (from the center of New Orleans to the banks of the Mississippi River, Feb.
19, 1825); 4 MASS. LAWS (1807-16) 113 (turnpike across Boston Neck, Mar. 3,
1810).
" REv. LAWS N. J. (1820) 813 (listing in a schedule of private acts the in-
corporation on Feb. 6, 1815, of a railroad from Trenton to New Brunswick) ; 8
PA. LAWS (1822-5) 152 (Mar. 31, 1823). It should be remembered that these
were not the familiar steam railroads which have since become a major factor in
transportation. However, it does seem to have been contemplated that the same
company which furnished the improved highway should also furnish the trans-
portation service and perhaps the vehicles; thus, the Pennsylvania statute provided
that all transportation should be under the direction of a designated person con-
nected with the enterprise.
2 3 MAss. LAWS (1780-1807) 29 (June 18, 1801); TAYLoR'S REvIsAL. N. C.
LAWS (1821-5) 156 (1824).
803 MAss. LAWS (1780-1807) 295 (Effiingham, New Hampshire, to Saco, Mar.
16, 1805).
' See TAYLoR's REvisAL. N. C. LAWS (1821-5) 156 (assenting to Tennessee
turnpike act, 1824).
1947]
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As with public highways3 2 so with turnpikes, the state's control was
not confined to their establishment but extended as well to authorizing
their discontinuance, even though under the circumstances the result
should be to sever the communication between a place within the state
and an extrastate community.33
Parallel activity to that of the states, in granting turnpike construc-
tion privileges, was exercised by Congress as a legislature for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, all such grants being strictly limited to roads within
the territorial limits of the District.3 4 Another technique employed by
Congress was to authorize the turnpike corporations of adjoining states
to extend their projects through and across the District, on the same
conditions and subject to the same tolls as those provided by the state
legislation for the portion within the creator state.35
Not that Congress was wholly silent on the matter of highways in its
capacity as legislature for the Union. The first instance of its activity
in this connection was legislation directing the postmaster general, in
the event a road designated as a post road was obstructed or not kept in
good repair, to report the matter to Congress, with such information as
might enable it to designate some alternative route in the same direc-
tion.3 6 Somewhat earlier, however, in the enabling act for the admission
of Ohio to statehood, a proviso had been inserted reserving a propor-
tion of the proceeds of the sale of public lands within its borders to
lay out and make public roads between the watershed of the Atlantic
Ocean and the Ohio River system3 7 and this was later followed up by
the act for the establishment of the Cumberland Road,3 8 to which the
fund arising under the earlier act was directed to be applied. Both of
these acts directed any action in execution of their terms upon the
seeking and obtaining consent of the states through whose limits the
road might run.39 Later legislation provided for extension of this
National Highway beyond its originally destined terminus at Wheeling
to the Illinois bank of the Mississippi.40 Moreover, the laying out of
roads through the territories of the United States not included in the
boundaries of any state was from time to time provided for by Con-
gress.4 ' By an extension of this practice, provision was also made for
"Z See statutes supra notes 19 and 20.
"Mass. Sess. Laws, May 1819, p. 294 (authorizing abandonment of a portion
of a turnpike east of New Lebanon, New York, and west of Lee, Massachusetts).
"See 2 STAT. 539 (1809) ; id. 570 (1810) ; 3 STAT. 5 (1813) ; 3 id. 12 (1813).
" 2 STAT. 808 (1813); 3 STAT. 391 (1817); id. 482 (1819) (all dealing with
Maryland corporations).
"12 STAT. 275 (1804). " 2 STAT. 173 (1802).
's2 STAT. 357 (1806).
"2 STAT. 175 (1802) ; id. 357 (1806).
403 STAT. 604 (1820).
,See 2 STAT. 396 (1806) (authorizing the laying out of roads from the
frontiers of Georgia en route from Athens to New Orleans; and from the Missis-
sippi to the Ohio in Illinois) ; 3 STAT. 318 (1816) (road in Illinois territory).
[Vol. 25
COMMERCE REGULATION
the laying out of roads which, while passing for the most part through
the territories, had also one terminus within the limits of a state4 ' as
well as for the erection of roads within the state of Ohio from interior
points to the exterior limits agreeably to the terms of treaties thereto-
fore entered into with the Indian tribes.48 Where Congress had author-
ized the establishment of a road through a territory admitted to state-
hood pending completion of the road, the federal legislature on occasion
retained its jurisdiction over the road to the extent at least of continuing
to pass the necessary legislation for its completion.
44
However, the states not only looked after the upkeep and repair of
the roads constructed under their own auspices. It also seems to have
been thought a part of their functions to keep in repair the interstate
trunk highways established and constructed by the Federal Government
or, at any rate, some of them certainly did assume jurisdiction in that
regard.45 On other occasions, Congress provided for the repair of such
roads, appropriating money for the purpose and providing that the re-
pairs be effected under the personal supervision of a superintendent to
be appointed by the President.4" In providing for the repair and im-
provement of post roads, however, the practice was for Congress to
confine its legislation to so much of such roads as lay across Indian
lands and not to undertake to legislate as to those parts lying outside
such reservations, within the several states.47 State assent was ex-
pressed when post road repairs were undertaken by the Federal Govern-
ment.48 The very fact of consent would seem to imply a want of power
in Congress to act independently without it in the improvement or main-
tenance of the highway system, even though the action was connected
with the express grant respecting "post roads" 49 in the Constitution.
That implication is confirmed by the style of the assenting legislation,
speaking in terms of "vesting powers" in Congress50 and even more by
422 STAT. 396 (1806) (authorizing the establishment of a road from Nashville in
the state of Tennessee to Natchez in Mississippi Territory) ; 3 STAT. 315 (1816)
(roads from Tennessee to Louisiana, and from Georgia to a point in the territories
to the westward) ; id. 377 (1817) (road from Tennessee to Mississippi Territory,
under the supervision of the Secretary of War, to run through the Chickasaw
Nation); id. 412 (1818) (road from Georgia point to a point in Alabama Terri-
trAl)k few instances may be observed in 2 STAT. 668 (1811) ; id. 670 (1812) ; 3
STAT. 727 (1823).
"' See 3 STAT. 412 (1818) (appropriation to complete the Mississippi portion of
a road from Louisiana to Tennessee).
" Cf. 2 DIG. LA. ACTS (1804-27) 325 (Feb. 26, 1822), 326 (Mar. 18, 1823 and
Feb. 7, 1824) (all dealing with the repair of the "great National Road" from
Nashville, Tennessee, to Madisonville, Louisiana).
"3 STAT. 728 (1823) (Cumberland Road).
473 STAT. 773 (1823) (public road from Nashville to New Orleans).
"1 LAws MD. 1692-1839 (ed. Dorsey) 482 (Nov. 1802).
"U. S. CONsT. Art. 1, §8, cl. 7 ("The Congress shall have power ... 7.
To establish post-offices and post-roads").
"01 LAWS MD. 1692-1839 (ed. Dorsey) 482 (Nov. 1802).
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conditions annexed to the consent, as that Congress should not authorize
changes in location or take materials for repairs without the consent
of the owners 51 (even though state officials in making repairs were com-
monly given the power to take such materials) 5 2 and that no title in or to
the soil should be taken by the Federal Government.5 3 Such propositions
can scarcely be reconciled with any notion that Congress possessed
power to act in the premises as a matter of constitutional grant.
So, too, the states assented to the location and establishment by
Congress of trunk roads running between states, so far as segments of
such roads lay within their respective limits, 4 reciting in doing so that
"the consent of the state [is] necessary to the opening of the same" 55 and
conditioning their assent by a declaration of the manner in which the
Federal Government should conduct itself in establishing the road author-
ized.56 In connection with such consent, states further expressly con-
ferred on the United States the right to do certain things necessarily
incidental to the construction of the road, such as to obtain.,materials
for it.
57
The states not only co-operated by giving their consents to the fed-
eral undertakings; they spurred Congress on to carry into execution the
program outlined in legislation.58 Sometimes state activity was prophetic
of what has since become a popular legislative pastime, consisting as it
did in urging the state's senators and representatives to endeavor to
secure federal funds for the construction of the projected improve-
ment 9 or in memorializing Congress in favor of its speedy completion. 0
But there was no regular course of legislative abdication by the states
and, as to uncompleted portions of the route marked out by federal
authority, they regarded themselves as competent to proceed to open
and improve them without let or hindrance, upon their own judgment
as to the expediency of action.6 ' Sometimes in establishing a public road
51 Ibid.
"See, for example, 1 N. C. REv. LAws (1821) 551 (1786).
1 LAws MD. 1692-1839 (ed. Dorsey) 482 (Nov. 1802).
1 LAWS MD. 1692-1839 (ed. Dorsey) 547 (Nov. 1806) (Cumberland Road);
Ohio Local Acts, 1st Sess. 1824, p. 87 (same) ; 4 PA. LAWs (1802-8) 408 (April
9, 1807) (same).
1 LAWS MD. 1692-1839 (ed. Dorsey) 547 (Nov. 1806).
See 4 PA. LAWS (1802-8) 408 (April 9, 1801) (Federal Government to pay
for materials taken on the same basis as the commonwealth in its road construction
programs).
"Ibid. (taking of materials in like manner as state road officials).
" See Ill. Laws 1824, p. 214 (resolution instructing Illinois' Senators and
Representatives to request the prompt permanent marking of the proposed United
States road from Wheeling to the Mississippi); Ind. Laws 1822, p. 152 (resolution
directing Indiana congressmen to work for the same road).
11 Ind. Laws 1822, p. 152 (National Road from Wheeling to the Mississippi).
'" See Ind. Special Acts 1823, p. 110.
" See Ill. Laws 1824, p. 214 (resolution urging prompt marking of the Na-
tional Road to the Mississippi "so as to enable the states through which it may
pass to have an opportunity of opening and improving the same, provided they
may deem it expedient").
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within the borders of a state, Congress turned over the actual execution
of the enterprise to the state, granting it tracts of public land adjacent
to the road to aid in defraying expenses, and authorizing construction
as directed by the state legislature, subject to the approval of the Presi-
dent.6 2 Congress would seem to have acquiesced in the notion that
this matter was one falling within the jurisdiction of the states, by legis-
lation granting to turnpike road and bridge corporations tracts of land
out of the places ceded to the United States by the states,63 authorizing
state turnpike companies to build bridges across coastal creeks lying
across their projected routes in such places, 64 and particularly by em-
powering state licensees to extend their roads through and across the
District of Columbia, subject to the same conditions and tolls as pre-
vailed in the connecting portions of the highway lying within state
borders.8 5
2. DEVELOPMENT OF INLAND WATERWAYS
Provisions declaring particular streams or parts of streams to be
public highways, or navigable streams, were common.6 6 Mostly the
rivers so designated were streams which, although flowing to the sea-
coast or tributary to an interstate stream, lay wholly within the enact-
ing state. In some cases, however, they were themselves interstate
streams in which case it was customary to limit the declaration to that
part of the river lying within the state's borders.67  Such a declaration
623 SrAT. 727 (1823).
e' See 2 STAT. 199 (1803) (authorizing the sale of part of Charlestown Navy
Yard grounds to proprietors of franchise for turnpike and bridge over coastal
river) ; 6 STAT. 161 (1816) (confirming to the Navigation Company of New Or-
leans the use and possession of a lot in said city, vesting the right and claim of
the United States therein).
64 See 2 STAT. 330 (1805) (bridge in the Brooklyn Navy Yard).
052 STAT. 808 (1813) ; 3 STAT. 391 (1817) ; id. 482 (1819).
"
6TouLmiN's DiG. LAWS AI.A. (1823) 75 (Conecuh and Sepulgah rivers, Dec.
13, 1821); Laws Ill. Terr. 1817-18, p. 38 (Big Muddy River); Ill. Laws 1819, p.
25 (Kaskaskia River); id. 69 (Cash River); Ill. Laws 1822-23, p. 81 (Sangamon
River); LAWS INDIANA Tm. 1809-16 (ed. Ewbank & Piker) 298 (Whitewater,
Feb. 16, 1813) ; Ind. Laws 1819, p. 58; Ind. Special Acts 1823, p. 46 (Blue River) ;
LAWS OF Disr. & Trm. LA. and TErR. & STATE Mo. (1842 ed.) 1003 (Cuivre
River, Dec. 17, 1822); 3 Rv. STAT. N. Y. (1827-8) 248 (naming a number of
streams, including several interstate rivers, April 2, 1813); id. 263 (Delaware
River, April 12, 1822) ; 2 N. C. Rv. LAWS (1821) 1248 (Roanoke River, 1812) ;
id. 1259 (Neuse River, 1812) ; id. 1336 (Cape Fear River, 1815) ; id. 1370 (Tar
River, 1816) ; id. 1375 (Catawba River, 1816) ; id. 1384 (Yadkin River) ; 1 PA.
LAWS (1700-1780) 322 (Delaware and Lehigh rivers, Mar. 9, 1771); id. 324
(Susquehanna, Juniata, and several other rivers, Mar. 9, 1771); 2 PA. LAWS
(1780-91) 311 (Susquehanna River, Mar. 31, 1785); 3 PA. LAWS (1791-1802)
127 (Conococheague Creek, April 8, 1794); id. 278 (Cohocksink Creek, Feb. 27,
1797); 5 PA. LAWS (1809-12) 83 (French Creek, Feb. 12, 1810); 1 TENN. LAWS
1820 (ed. Scott) 835 (North Fork of Holson River, Aug. 4, 1804) ; cf. R.v. STAT.
DE,. (1829) 83 (similar declaration with respect to proposed Chesapeake & Dela-
ware Canal, Jan. 29, 1801, Jan. 18, 1811); 1 N. C. Rlv. LAws (1821) 635 (same,
Pasquotank River & Elizabeth River canal, Dec. 15, 1790); 2 TmN. LAWS 1820(ed. Scott) 106 (Oct. 11, 1813).67LAWS INDIANA TEaR. 1809-16 (ed. Ewbank & Piker) 298 (Whitewater to
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was more than a mere flourish of legislative rhetoric. It imputed to
the stream certain attributes of practical significance for purposes of
travel and transit-the right of the public to pass freely up and down
it, a prohibition against riparian owners erecting or maintaining in it
obstructions, such as dams, which they might lawfully maintain in non-
navigable streams, the applicability to it of the general statutes for the
removal or penalizing the creation of obstructions to navigation. The
purpose of such legislation was clearly revealed in the occasional statu-
tory recitals of an object to permit the egress of particular classes of
commodities from the state68 or declarations of the enactment as being
at the instance of the legislature of a sister state whose citizens wished
to use the stream for navigation.69
Just as the states retained power to abandon their land highways
and to authorize abandonment of turnpikes, so they might disestablish
a stream's status as a public highway, thus withdrawing it from service
as a channel of interstate intercourse.70
Little else beyond the formal legislative declaration was needed as to
streams or parts of streams which in their natural condition were ad-
equate for the purposes of such water-borne traffic as had occasion to use
them. Occasional prohibition prospectively of the erection of dams and
obstructions in or bridges over such streams, authorizing removal thereof
by anyone at will without prejudice to the maintenance of existing struc-
tures, seems to represent the sum of such additional legislation with
reference to waterways of that character. 71 It is worthy of note, how-
ever, that such prohibition was not confined to the interior waterways
of the several states but that on occasion jurisdiction was assumed to
forbid such conduct as to boundary rivers, the enacting state then pre-
scribing the manner in which permission to make such an alteration
should be obtained.72
the Ohio line, Feb. 16, 1813) ; 3 Rzv. STAT. N. Y. (1827-28) 263 (Delaware River,
April 12, 1822) ; 2 N. C. REv. LAWS (1821) (Roanoke River to the Virginia line,
1812) ; id. 1375 (Catawba River to the South Carolina line, 1816) ; id. 1384 (Yad-
kin River to the South Carolina line, 1816) ; 2 PA. LAWS (1780-91) 311 (Susque-
hanna River to the Maryland line, Mar. 31, 1785); 3 PA. LAws (1791-1802) 127(Conococheague Creek from Chambersburg to the Maryland line, April 22, 1794).
18 See 2 PA. LAWS (1780-91) 311 (Susquehanna River declared a public river
to the Maryland line so as to permit the rafting of timber to Chesapeake Bay,
Mar. 31, 1785).
09 1 TENN. LAWs 1820 (ed. Scott) 835 (Aug. 4, 1804).70 Cf. Ohio Sess. Acts, 1st Sess. 1822, p. 25 (Stillwater branch of the Miami
River) ; 2 TENN. LAWS 1820 (ed. Scott) 82 (repealing an act forbidding obstruc-
tions in the Red River between Port Royal and the Kentucky line, Oct. 8, 1812).
71 REv. LAWS N. J. (1820) 22 (dams and obstructions, 1755); 1 PA. LAWs
(1700-1780) 168 (bridges, Aug. 14, 1725) ; 2 TENN. LAws 1820 (ed. Scott) 106(mills and fish-dams, Oct. 11, 1813); cf. 1 N. Y. REv. STAT. (1827-28) 686 (pres-
ence of weirs, posts and other obstructions in the Hudson River, New York Bay,
and other named waters prohibited under penalty).
' 
2 REv. LAWs N. J. (1820) 708 (Delaware River between Pennsylvania and
New Jersey, Mar. 1, 1820).
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Where the stream in question required dredging, widening, straight-
ening, or similar improvements in order to be a useful artery of travel,
more was needed however than a simple legislative declaration of
navigable character. If the potential route was to serve efficiently as a
means of ingress to and egress from the communities bordering it,
works had to be undertaken not essentially unlike the construction of
artificial land highways to inland points. The modes chosen by the states
in handling the highway problem were accordingly those employed in
the artificial development of existing waterways. Public road legisla-
tion and turnpike legislation had their respective parallels in statutes
providing for the improvement of waterways under public auspices73
and private franchises.
7 4
1 To.mmIN'S DIG. LAWS ALA. (1823) 702 (Mar. 1, 1808); id. 703 (Nov. 27,
1810) (both general statutes, conferring authority on county courts); PRINCE's
DIG. LAws GA. (1819) 203 (named rivers, including some interstate boundary
rivers); Fosa's DIG. LAWS GA. (1820-29) 129 (named water courses) ; id. 131
(Dec. 26, 1826) ; LAws INDIANA TnRo. 1809-16 (ed. Ewbank & Piker) 298 (White-
water to the Ohio line, Feb. 16, 1813); 1 DIG. LA. ACTS (1804-27) 558 (Pearl
and Red rivers, Mar. 12, 1822); 3 MAss. LAws (1780-1807) 50 (Connecticut
River, Feb. 25, 1802); 1 N. C. REv. LAWS (1821) 536 (1785); 2 N. C. REv.
LAws (1821) 1547 (Broad River to the South Carolina line, 1820); 1 PA. LAWS
(1700-80) 235 (Schuylkill River, Mar. 14, 1761); id. 322 (Delaware and Lehigh
rivers, Mar. 9, 1771) ; id. 324 (Susquehanna, Juniata, and other named rivers, Mar.
9, 1771); 3 PA. LAWS (1791-1802) 24 (April 13, 1791); 3 BREvAPD's DIG. PuB.
STAT. LAWS S. C. 254 (Black River, 1784); id. 255 (Pedee River, 1785); id. 277
(Savannah River to Augusta, Georgia, 1795); 6 McCORD STAT. AT LARGE S. C.
124 (Savannah River, Dec. 18, 1819) ; 1 TENN. LAWS 1820 (ed. Scott) 835 (North
Fork of Holston River, Aug. 4, 1804); REv. CODE VA. Stupp. (1833) 420 (James
River, Feb. 17, 1820) ; cf. 3 STAT. 583 (1820) (charter of Washington, city author-
ized to preserve the navigation of the Potomac and Anacostia rivers adjoining
the city); MOORHEAD & BROWN DIG. STAT. LAWS Ky., title 125 (county courts
empowered to appoint inspectors of navigable streams with authority to clear out
ripples and cut away trees and bushes on river banks, with powers and duties
parallel to those of road overseers) ; REv. CODE Miss. (1824) 630 (Natchez harbor
master authorized to direct removal of nuisances and obstructions from the river) ;
LAWS DIsT. & TERo. LA. and TEER. & STATE Mo. (1842 ed.) 967 (charter of St.
Louis, authorizing the city "to improve and preserve the navigation of the Missis-
sippi within the city," Dec. 9, 1822); REv. LAWS N. J. (1820) 664 (charter of
Jersey City, authorizing the city to regulate obstructions to the navigation of the
river) ; 1 N. C. REv. LAWS (1821) 515 (county courts authorized to clear inland
rivers and creeks, 1784) ; 2 N. C. REv. LAWS (1821) 815 (amendment of foregoing
act, 1796) ; 4 PA. LAWS (1802-08) 244 (removal of sandbar from Delaware River,
April 1, 1805).
"'TouLMIN's DIG. LAWS ALA. (1823) 709 (Flint River, Dec. 20, 1820); id.
710 (Indian Creek, Dec. 21, 1810); id. 715 (Murder Creek, Dec. 15, 1821) ; REV.
STAT. DEL. (1829) 587 (Christiana Creek, Jan. 29, 1821); id. 622 (Mispillion
Creek, Feb. 1, 1827) ; id. 624 (Murderkill Creek, Jan. 22, 1810) ; Laws Ill. Terr.
1817-8, p. 4 (Little Wabash River) ; 2 LIrT. (Ky.) 448 (Kentucky River, 1801) ;
2 MAss. LAWS (1780-1807) 527 (Connecticut River, Feb. 25, 1792) ; id. 553 (Mer-
rimack River, June 27, 1792); Sess. Laws Mass. May 1816, p. 222 (same) ; id.
448 (Penobscot River); Sess. Laws Mass., Jan. 1818, p. 536 (Kennebec River);
1 N. C. Rnv. LAWS (1821) 694 (Cape Fear River, 1792); id. 729 (same, 1793);
2 N. C. REV. LAWS (1821) 818 (Cape Fear, Deep, and Haw rivers, 1796) ; id.
1248 (Roanoke River, 1812); id. 1259 (Neuse River, 1812) ; id. 1136 (Cape Fear
River, 1815); id. 1370 (Tar River, 1816); id. 1375 (Catawba River, 1816); id.
1384 (Yadkin River, 1816) ; id. 1548 (New River, 1820) ; 3 PA. LAWS (1791-1802)
311 (Lehigh River, Feb. 27, 1798); 4 PA. LAWS (1802-08) 6 (Conococheague
Creek, Feb. 7, 1803); 8 PA. LAws (1822-25) 429 (Lackawaxen River, April 1,
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In a fairly immediate sense, every such improvement had to do with
a channel of at least potential interstate and international communica-
tion, since every stream either flowed immediately to the Atlantic, the
Gulf of Mexico, or the Great Lakes, or was tributary to a river system
which did and which in its course might pass through or alongside other
states. Of particular interest perhaps in indicating the extent of the
states' supposed jurisdiction in this connection are those instances where
the improvement of navigation had to do with a boundary river.75 The
legislators were not unconscious of the interstate importance of some of
these projects. They realized that they would affect interests in the
states on both sides of the stream and might require outlays for their
successful completion in excess of the resources of either state singly.
The magnitude of the undertaking and its multi-state significance led
them to think in terms not of state paralysis but of state co-operation.
Accordingly, machinery was set in motion in such cases to secure the
participation of all interested states in the projected improvement of
the navigation. 76 Even in such instances, however, there was no feeling
that the consent of the other interested state or states was prerequisite
to the initiation of action; instead, the individual states moved independ-
ently to appropriate for and proceed with the project 77 or to issue char-
ters for navigation improvements, 78 in all respects similar to those where
the factor of multi-states concern was not injected into the legislation,
1825); see Pit icE's DiG. LAWS GA. (1819) 577 (schedule of local and private
acts, listing four navigation companies) ; cf. 1 DIG. LA. Acrs (1804-27) 561 (grant
of exclusive steamboat privilege for limited term to individual undertaking to
effect the improvement of the navigation of the Red River); 3 MASS. LAws
(1780-1807) 103 (construction of canal around the falls of the Saco River, Feb.
22, 1803) ; 2 REV. CODE VA. (1819) c. 235, §§22, 23 (no dams to be erected in
waters subject to franchise for improvement of navigation without consent of com-
pany, and all dams to be held subject to commonwealth's right to grant franchise
for such improvements and for making locks in dams, without provision for com-
pensation, 1815).
PRINcE's DIG. LAWS GA. (1819) 203 (Dec. 19, 1817); Fosvm's DiG. LAWS
GA. (1820-29) 134 (Dec. 20, 1826) (both having to do with the Savannah River);
Laws Ill. Terr. 1817-8, p. 57 ("the waters near the mouth of the Ohio River") ;
Ill. Laws 1824, p. 96 (Wabash River); Ind. Special Acts 1823, p. 82 (same); 1
DiG. LA. AcTs (1804-27) 558 (Pearl River, Mar. 12, 1822); 3 PA. LAWS (1791-
1802) 23 (Delaware River, April 13, 1791); 3 BREvAiw's DiG. PUB. STAT. LAWS
S. C. 277 (Savannah River to Augusta, Georgia, 1795).
" See fll. Laws 1822-3, p. 72 (suggesting to Indiana common action in im-
provement of Wabash, each state to appoint commissioners to survey obstructions
"and report a program for improvement' of the navigation) ; Ind. Laws 1821, p.
46 (similar action as to same subject, but proposing concurrent action by commis-
sioners from the two states); nd. Special Acts 1823, P. 78 (same); 1 DIG. LA.
Acs (1804-27) 558 (for opening navigation of the Pearl River, reciting that con-
tributions for the purpose were also being made by Mississippi, Mar. 12, 1822);
6 McColl STAT. AT LARGE S. C. 127 (commissioners appointed to act in con-junction with Georgia commissioners in improving navigation of the SavannahRiver, De. 18, 1819).
'27o7d. Special Acts 1823, p. 82 (Wabash River).
Ill. Laws 1824, p. 96 (Wabash Navigation Company erected, reserving to
Indiana a right to join in the benefits).
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except that they provided for the admission of the others to the benefits
to accrue, should they desire to join in the act.
Much the same technique for co-operation was employed as to rivers
crossing state lines, with the upper riparian state resorting to the device
of requesting the lower riparian to improve so much of the stream as
lay within its borders, where improvement throughout the whole length
was desired ;70 or accepting conditional legislation by the latter in charter-
ing a company to clear the navigation throughout the river's entire ex-
tent and to mesh it with a proposed canal into an integrated system of
waterways involving action by several states ;8 or appointing commis-
sioners to investigate into the best mode of improving the navigation of
the river, with the proviso that they should work in conjunction with
similar officials chosen by other interested states in the event those states
should take such action.81 Again, there may be found legislation by an
upper riparian state providing, at the request of the lower riparian, for
the removal of obstructions to the navigation which were seriously bur-
dening the latter's citizens desirous of using the river as a travel route.82
In connection with the merger of a local navigation improvement
company with a canal company of an adjoining state, both waterways
opening into a boundary river, the canal company acquiring the privi-
lege of improving the navigation was subjected to the conditions stated
in its predecessor navigation company's original grant of authority and
was ordered to provide a passage for watercraft using the boundary
river, without charge and without delay. 8 Where an adjoining state
co-operated with the initiating state in a scheme of canal and inland
navigation development, the initiating state sometimes undertook in re-
turn for such co-operation to relieve any goods introduced from the
other state from any charges or restrictions on their introduction. 4
When the Federal Government wished to make improvements in the
channels of interstate rivers, the procedure employed was to apply for
and obtain the legislative assent of the states particularly affected to such
"" See LAWs INDIANA TmaR. 1809-16 (ed. Ewbank & Piker) 390 (joint resolu-
tion requesting Ohio legislature to cause to be opened and made navigable so much
of the Whitewater as lay within that state, adopted practically contemporaneously
with an Indiana law for the improvement of the Whitewater within Indiana, Feb.
18, 1813).
113 PA. LAWS (1791-1802) 462 (in response to a Maryland act for construction
of a canal from the Chesapeake Bay to the Delaware River, and the improvement
of the navigation of the Susquehanna River, Feb. 19, 1801).
"14 PA. LAWS (1802-08) 220 (navigation of the Ohio River, co-operation of
Kentucky and Virginia suggested, Mar. 7, 1805).
81 TENN. LAWS 1820 (ed. Scott) 835 (improvement in the North Fork of the
Holston River at the request of the Virginia legislature, Aug. 4, 1804).
838 PA. LAWS (1822-25) 429 (April 1, 1825).
'1 BnvA&'s DIG. PUs. STAT. LAWS S. C. 415 (goods from North Carolina
travelling into the state over rivers and canals managed by the Catawba Naviga-
tion Company, 1795).
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proposed federal action. 5 Conversely, state legislation was occasionally
enacted to take effect only when consent thereto by the United States
should be given;86 but this seems to have been done only where the
navigation or harbor improvement was to be financed by a tonnage tax
and the assent desired was clearly the assent constitutionally required"7
for the impostion of such a tax, the assumption evidently being that aside
from that special situation there was nothing in the federal Constitution
to impede state action.
The most ambitious type of waterway project was the canal. Canals
were the internal improvements par excellence of the era. Their facil-
ities, artificially created at great expense, constituted the nearest ap-
proach to those which were later to be afforded by the railroad system.
It took more than a petty local traffic between interior points to justify
and support such large scale undertakings. It is manifest from an ex-
amination of the canal legislation of the time that here was something
designed peculiarly to serve as a route for intercourse and traffic extend-
ing beyond the bounds of any single state. Yet with these pre-eminently
interstate trade arteries as with all the other highways and waterways
which have been examined, we find a regime of state regulations. Two
very notable canal enterprises, linking the Hudson River with Lake Erie
and with Lake Champlain, were completed by New York as state under-
takings.88 Besides these, the construction of important canal projects
as state works was authorized by various of the states-by Indiana near
the falls of the Ohio River,8 9 by Ohio under a general lawO0 -and pre-
liminary steps were taken which never came to fruition looking to state
construction of important canal systems.0 1
Ordinarily, however, the states did not themselves propose to con-
" N. H. ComP. LAWS (1830) 41 (consenting to removal by the United States
of rocks in the channel of the Piscataqua River, June 29, 1825).
"See 4 PA. LAws (1802-08) 244 (April 1, 1805) ; 5 PA. LAWS (1809-12) 213
(Mar. 20, 1811).
8 U. S. Co NsT., Art. 1, §10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the consent of
Congress, lay any duty of tonnage...").
88 See 1 REv. STAT. N. Y. (1827-28) 217, describing these projects as com-
pleted, in listing the navigable waterways of the state.
8-Ind. Special Acts 1823, p. 78. This legislation had been preceded by grants
of franchises for the same purpose to incorporators on two different occasions, but
they apparently had not proceeded in the manner requisite for retention of their
franchises.
80 Ohio Sess. Acts, 1st Sess. 1825, p. 50.
81 See Ill. Laws 1822-23, p. 151 (commissioners appointed to survey and report
on possible canal route between Lake Michigan and the Illinois River) ; Ohio Laws
1820, p. 147 (similar action as to canal between Lake Erie and the Ohio River) ;
Ohio Laws 1820, 2nd Sess., p. 24 (same); 8 PA. LAws (1822-25) 478 (com-
missioners appointed for "the establishment of a communication between the East-
ern and the Western waters of this state, and the lakes," April 11, 1825); 6
McCORD STAT. AT LARGE S. C. 124 (board of public works set up with power, inter
alia, to see to the establishment of canal communications between the Savannah
River and various South Carolina coastal rivers, Dec. 18, 1819) ; REv. CODE VA.
1833 Surp. 420 (action for uniting the eastern and the western waters by the
James and the Kanawha rivers, Feb. 17, 1820).
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struct the canals but rather, following the analogy of turnpike roads and
navigation improvement companies, chartered companies for the purpose
of building them between designated termini. Sometimes the entire
course of the canal lay within the territory of the incorporating state,
that course being so specified as to connect interior watercourses9 2 or
communities within the state93 with the ocean or with a state boundary
stream or lake, to form a more convenient passage between boundary
watercourses94 or interior watercourses, 95 or, in the Great Lakes states,
to join those important bodies of water with important interior water-
courses communicating with other states.96 Again, only one of the
termini-and hence only a part of the route-lay within the borders of
the chartering state97 or the canal was described as joining with one
authorized by another state up to the state line so as to form a con-
tinuous communication between points in the two states.98
When other states were interested in promoting such an interstate
canal, because for instance of their lying on a boundary river which
would constitute one of the termini of the canal, a method sometimes
employed by such states as an appropriate one for bringing about the
improvement was to solicit the concurrent action of the legislatures of
the states through which it would run.99 Furthermore, where the mag-
"'See FosTza's DIG. LAws GA. (1820-29) 135 (Dec. 26, 1826); 2 DIG. LA.
Acts (1804-27) 88 (July 3, 1805); 1 MAss. LAws (1780-1807) 510 (June 17,
1791) ; id. 536 (Connecticut River to Boston; a principal incorporator was Henry
Knox, then serving as Secretary of War in Washington's cabinet, Mar. 10, 1792) ;
4 MAss. LAws (1807-16) 237 (June 21, 1811); ComP. Pun. LAWS N. J. (1833)
161 (Jan. 26, 1828) ; Ohio Sess. Acts, 1st Sess. 1827, p. 92 (Milan to Lake Erie);
5 PA. LAWS (1809-12) 266 (April 2, 1811).
93 See Ill. Laws 1819, p. 121; 2 MAss. LAws (1780-1807) 563 (Mar. 9, 1793);
id. 723 (Feb. 26, 1796) ; Mass. Sess. Laws, May 1819, p. 273; cf. REv. LAWS N. J.
(1820) 114 (Nov. 22, 1791); 1 N. C. Ray. LAws (1821) 769 (1795); 3 PA. LAWS
1791-1802) 114 (April 10, 1793) ; 8 PA. LAWS (1822-25) 177 (April 1, 1823).
"' See Laws Ill. Terr. 1817-8, p. 57 (canal to facilitate passage of boats from
the Ohio to the Mississippi); LAws INDIANA TERR. 1801-09 (ed. Philbrick) 154
(cut-off canal at the falls of the Ohio; the project is especially interesting because
of the identity of some of the incorporators, who included, inter alia, Aaron Burr,
George Rogers Clark, and Jonathan Dayton, one of the delegates to the Constitu-
tional Convention, Aug. 24, 1805) ; Ind. Private Acts 1817-18 (same project) ; Ky.
Sess. Acts 1818, p. 419 (Ohio River); 3 Lrrr. (Ky.) 221 (same, 1804); Mass.
Sess. Laws, Jan. 1818, p. 560 (Cape Cod Bay and Buzzards' Bay); Mass. Sess.
Laws, Jan. 1822, p. 671 (canal at Gloucester to short cut navigation around Cape
Ann); COMP. PuB. LAws N. J. (1833) 91 (canal between Raritan and Delaware
rivers, Dec. 30, 1824); id. 92 (canal between Passaic and Delaware rivers, Dec.
31, 1824).
2 N. C. Ray. LAWs (1821) 1390 (Yadkin and Cape Fear rivers, 1816).
'a Ill. Laws 1824, p. 160 (Lake Michigan and the Illinois River).
'7 See REv. STAT. DEL. (1829) 83 (canal between Delaware River and Chesa-
peake Bay, Jan. 29, 1801, Jan. 18, 1811); 1 N. C. REv. LAWS (1821) 635 (con-
necting Pasquotank River in North Carolina with Elizabeth River in Virginia,
Dec. 25, 1790); id. 699 (amending the foregoing, 1792); Ohio Sess. Acts, 1st
Sess. 1827, p. 1 (interior Ohio point to Pittsburgh).
98 See 3 PA. LAWS (1791-1802) 114 (to connect the water of Brandywine Creek
wth a Delaware canal passing through that state to Christiana Creek, April 10,
1793).
"' Ill. Laws 1822-23, p. 151 (inviting preliminary action by the Ohio and In-
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nitude of the project and the substantial character of another state's
share in the intercourse to be generated by it led the state within whose
borders the canal would be constructed to suppose that such other state
would be willing to assist, the legislature, in authorizing the undertaking,
might solicit the co-operation of such other interested state and offer it a
share in the improvement as a joint venture of the two states.10 0 Should
the project appeal to the latter, it then adopted legislation auxiliary to
that of the state initiating the action, in aid of corporations set up by the
latter to carry out the undertaking.10 ' Similarly the co-operation of the
Federal Government in the construction of the canal might be solicited, if
the waterway were felt to be of national significance, although even in
such cases it would seem to have been contemplated that the state com-
missioners should draw up the plans for the project, leaving as the fed-
eral role largely that of supplying the finances.'
0 2
Of independent Congressional legislation on canals, there is very
little to be found and that in all cases related to independent specific con-
stitutional grants of power other than the commerce clause. In an act
providing fortifications and defenses for the country's seaports and har-
bors, Congress did include provision for deepening a canal in the neigh-
borhood of New Orleans, so as to admit of the passage of gunboats, and
for extending it to the Mississippi River if, in the President's opinion,
that would conduce to the more effectual defense of the city.103 It also
granted the usual privileges to a company for the construction of a
canal within the limits of the District of Columbia. 0 4 Where a state-
projected canal lay for part of the distance through public lands reserved
to the United States, the latter's consent to the construction of the canal
by the state was given, saving to the Federal Government, however, the
right to pass along it without payment of tolls or charges.'0 5
diana legislatures looking to the construction of a canal from the Maumee River
to the Wabash River) ; 3 PA. LAWS (1791-1802) 462 (accepting and conforming
with a Maryland law for the construction of a canal between the Delaware River
and Chesapeake Bay, Feb. 19, 1801).
"0 See Ind. Special Acts 1823, p. 80 (application to Ohio to join in construction
of canal at the Falls of the Ohio River).
1012 N. C. REv. LAws (1821) 1532 (auxiliary to a Virginia act setting up a
company to establish communications between the Roanoke River, the tributaries
of the Chowan River, and any watercourses lying between them and the Potomac
River, 1820) ; TAYLOR'S REvISAL N. C. LAws (1821-25) 186 (assenting to a Vir-
ginia act conferring power on the Dismal Swamp Canal Company to open a navi-
gable communication between that canal and the nearest point in the Northwest
(Ohio?) River, 1925); 8 PA. LAws (1822-25) 431 (consenting to a New Jersey
act establishing the Delaware and Raritan Canal insofar as that involved use of
the waters of the Delaware River, April 9, 1825) ; cf. id. 429 (vesting the privi-
lege of improvement of the Lackawaxen River in a New York company estab-
lished to build a canal between the Delaware and the Hudson, subject to various
qualifications stated, April 1, 1825).102 Cf. Ohio Laws 1820, p. 147.
10°2 STAT. 516 (1809). 1042 STAT. 517 (1809).
"13 STAT. 659 (1820) (Illinois canal between Lake Michigan and the Illinois
River).
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3. BRIDGES AND FERRIES
All that the carrier or traveler, whose journey involved movement
either wholly over a highway or wholly along a stream, needed to have
provided for him was a usable artery of traffic adapted to his vehicle or
vessel; he could himself do everything else requisite. But the problem
was complicated when a road was interrupted by a stream. Here some
special facilities had to be provided for the land traveler if he were to
get across and be on his way on the other side of the water. Two solu-
tions were available. Either there might be a fixed extension of the
highway across the stream; i.e., a bridge, in which case the traveler
needed only, as before, to have the facility provided and he could do
the rest; or there might be a moving projection of the highway; i.e., a
ferry boat, in which case, while superficially it would appear that for a
part of the time vehicle and motive power as well as highway were being
furnished the traveler, in effect what he was getting was a floating
bridge. Either bridge or ferry might be of moment to interstate traffic
by land in so far as they linked, within a state, segments of a highway
which itself was a channel of communication with other states. Further-
more a bridge across a navigable stream was also of interest to interstate
traffic by water because of its potential hindrance to such traffic.
The consolidated general laws displayed a tendency to remit the
establishment and regulation of bridges and ferries to local authorities,
who were given the discretion to grant ferry licensesi" and to provide
for the building of bridges1 7 or in other jurisdictions were flatly di-
rected to establish and maintain ferries 0 8 or bridges.10 9 Still another
alternative adopted was to entrust the function of establishing ferries to
municipalities as a discretionary matter.1" 0 This was the manner in
1 06 TouLmIN's DIG. LAws ALA. (1823) 391 (Dec. 21, 1820); PRINcE's DIG.
LAWS GA. (1819) 400 (Dec. 6, 1805); LAWS INDIANA TEm 1801-1809 (ed. Phil-
brick) 352 (Sept. 17, 1807) ; Ind. Acts 1817-18, p. 292; MOOREEAD & BROWN DIG.
STAT. LAWS Ky. (1834) title 79 (Dec. 22, 1800); 2 REv. LAWS ME. (1821) 768;
1 LAWS MD. 1692-1839 (ed. Dorsey) 175 (May 1781); id. 425 (Nov. 1799); 1
LAWS DisT. & TER. LA. and Trout. & STATE Mo. (1842 ed.) 80 (July 9, 1806);
id. 699 (Dec. 8, 1820) ; 1 REv. STAT. N. Y. (1827-28) 526; 1 N. C. REv. LAWS
(1821) 515 (1784) ; Ohio Laws 1820, p. 171; 1 LAWS TENN. 1820 (ed. Scott) 656
(Oct. 26, 1799); Comp,. LAWS VT. (1824) 477 (Mar. 3, 1797); cf. REv. CoDE
Miss. (1824) 350.
107 PRiNcE's DIG. LAWS GA. (1819) 399 (Dec. 4, 1799) ; id. 400 (Dec. 6, 1805);
REv. CODE Miss. (1824) 350; 1 N. C. REv. LAWS (1821) 515 (1784); Coup.
LAWS VT. (1824) 432 (Mar. 3, 1797) ; cf. 2 DIG. LA. AcTs (1804-27) 312 (Mar.
12, 1818).
.p.. P . STAT. CONN. (1824) 166; 2 MAss. LAWS (1780-1807) 749 (Feb. 14,
1797)1.P1  m.Pt. STAT. CONN. (1824) 220.
110REV. CODE Miss. (1824) 636 (Natchez, Feb. 5, 1818); REV. LAWS N. J
(1820) 66 (Perth Amboy charter, Dec. 21, 1784); id. 73 (Burlington charter, Dec.
21, 1784); Ohio Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1827, p. 46 (Cincinnati charter); cf. 3
BREvARD's DIG. Ptu. STAT. LAWS S. C. 137 (charter of Georgetown, authorization
to regulate ferries on the Charleston road and on the road leading to North Car-
olina, 1791).
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which Congress chose to deal with the subject in legislating for the
District of Columbia.' Occasionally the statutes were so worded as to
make it clear that the authority was not confined to ferries over interior
rivers but extended as well to interstate ferry franchises over boundary
streams.1 2
This way of handling the matter was by no means universal, how-
ever. Examples are plentiful where the legislature itself granted licenses
directly to petitioners for the operation of ferries at designated local-
ities,113 including ferries across interstate boundary waters,114 and where
it authorized the construction and maintenance of specified bridges
across coastal rivers,115 or streams flowing to or from, 116 or forming a
112 STAT. 195 (1802) (charter of Washington, empowering the municipal
authorities to erect and repair bridges).
..
2 LAWs INDIANA Tam. 1809-16 (ed. Ewbank & Piker) 649 (Ohio River,
Dec. 26, 1815); MooRHEAD & BvowN DIG. STAT. LAWS Ky. (1834) title 79 (Dec.
22, 1806) ; REv. CoDE Miss. (1824) 636 (city of Natchez authorized to regulate and
lease ferry between there and Louisiana, Feb. 5, 1818); Ohio Laws 1820, p. 171("ferry on or across any of the waters running through or bounding this state") ;
Ohio Sess. Acts, 1st Sess. 1827, p. 46 (charter of Cincinnati, authorizing city to
regulate ferries across the Ohio River).
See REv. STAT. DF.L. (1829) 606 (Jan. 27, 1808); PRiNcE's DIG. LAWS GA.(1819) 417 (schedule of special ferry franchises) ; REv. LAws N. J. (1820) 810(same) ; 2 PA. LAWS (1780-91) 332 (Sept. 6, 1785) ; 3 BREvARw's DIG. Pu. STAT.
LAWS S. C. 358 (ferry on the Charleston to North Carolina road, 1779) ; cf. 1
LAWS MD. 1692-1839 (ed. Dorsey) 425 (validating act for ferries de facto estab-
lished, Nov. 1799).
1' REv. STAT. D. (1829) 602 (ferry across the Delaware River at Newcastle,
Jan. 21, 1803); PRIxcE's DIG. LAWS GA. (1819) 417 (fourteen ferries over the
Savannah River listed in schedule of ferry franchises); Ill. Laws 1819, p. 104(Mississippi River) ; Ill. Laws 1824, p. 79 (same) ; id. 114 (Ohio River) ; Ind.
Laws 1821, p. 146 (same); 3 BREvARD's DIG. PuB. STAT. LAwS S. C. 347 (1769) ;
ibid. (1770); id. 354 (1778) ; id. 362 (1784) ; id. 367 (1786) ; id. 384 (1789) ; id.
399 (1796); id. 436 (1807) (all involving ferries over the Savannah River); 2
REv. CoDE VA. (1819) 23 (Potomac River, Jan. 30, 1819) ; ibid. (Ohio River, Jan.
30, 1819); cf. Ill. Laws 1822-23, p. 142 (Shawneetown empowered to maintain a
ferry over the Ohio River).
1 REv. STAT. DEL. (1829) 566 (Jan. 16, 1798) ; ibid. (Feb. 2, 1802) ; id. 567(Jan. 30, 1813) ; id. 568 (Feb. 2, 1793) ; id. 569 (Nov. 6, 1773) ; id. 574 (Feb. 5,
1802) ; id. 578 (Feb. 3, 1813) ; id. 581 (Jan. 20, 1807) ; 1 MASS. LAWS (1780-1807)
226 (Mar. 9, 1785) ; id. 544 (Mar. 9, 1792) ; 2 MASS. LAws (1780-1807) 616 (Feb.
25, 1794) ; id. 635 (Feb. 27, 1794) ; id. 698 (Feb. 8, 1796) ; id. 741 (June 17, 1796) ;
id. 796 (June 22, 1797); 3 MASS. LAWS (1780-1807) 29 (June 19, 1801); id. 324(Mar. 3, 1806) ; 4 MASS. LAWS (1807-16) 483 (June 13, 1815) ; Mass. Sess. Laws,
Jan. 1818, p. 605; Mass. Sess. Laws, Jan. 1819, p. 185; cf. 2 MASS. LAWS (1780-
1807) 572 (Mar. 26, 1793); 3 MASS. LAWS (1780-1807) 315 (bridge across es-
tuary, Feb. 24, 1806); 4 MAss. LAWS (1807-16) 1 (bridge in Boston harbor from
island to mainland, June 19, 1807) ; Mass. Sess. Laws 1816, p. 228 (same).
. Ind. Laws 1822, p. 97 (White Water); 2 MASS. LAWS (1780-1807) 723
(Androscoggin River, Feb. 26, 1796) ; id. 742 (Connecticut River, June 18, 1796) ;
id. 796 (Androscoggin River, June 22, 1797); 4 MASS. LAWS (1807-16) 343 (same,
Feb. 27, 1813); 3 PA. LAWS (1791-1802) 436 (Youghiogheny River, Mar. 15,
1800); 5 PA. LAWS (1809-12) 114 (Monongahela River at Pittsburgh, Mar. 19,
1810); id. 159 (Allegheny River at Pittsburgh, Mar. 20, 1810); 2 LAWS TENN.
1820 (ed. Scott) 78 (Clinch River, 1812); cf. Laws Ill. Terr. 1817-18, p. 36
(Kaskaskia River); Ill. Laws 1819, p. 103 (Little Wabash River); id. 364 (Kas-
kaskia River); Ill. Laws 1820-21, p. 145 (same); id. 156 (four named rivers);
Ill. Laws 1822-23, p. 200 (Cahokia Creek); 1 DIG. LA. ACTS (1804-27) 134 (Bayou
Lafourche) ; 3 PA. LAWS (1791-1802) 274 (Lehigh River, April 4, 1796) ; id. 290
(same, Mar. 28, 1797); id. 312 (Schuylkill River, Mar. 16, 1798); 4 PA. LAWS
(1802-08) 297 (same, Mar. 10, 1806).
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boundary with,"17 other states-at least some of such bridges being ad-
juncts to highways which were avenues of interstate intercourse."18 Con-
gress, as a legislature for the District of Columbia, in this manner au-
thorized construction of bridges over the Potomac River within the
District.110
Where a bridge was to cross an interstate boundary river, a standard
procedure was for both the riparian states to grant the privilege of
erection and maintenance of the bridge to the same group of appli-
cants 20 or to appoint commissioners to act in conjunction for the estab-
lishment of the bridge.121 The state initiating action would in such
cases recognize the interest of the other state by expressly conditioning
the operation of the act on the adoption of similar legislation there.122
The heavy capital investment required for the construction of a turn-
pike or a canal was in itself ordinarily an adequate guaranty that an
established route would not be substantially duplicated by another entre-
preneur; and of course overlapping improvement of a navigable channel
was a physically impossible phenomenon. But there was no equivalent
financial or physical assurance that a bridge or ferry would not be sub-
ject to the risk of establishment of competing facilities close at hand.
The installation cost of such a service was not in itself high enough to
insure that the first ferryman or bridge in a locality which had proved
to be profitable would be allowed to maintain the initial monopoly.
Faced with this condition, legislatures commonly gave some assurance
"'2 MASS. LAWS (1780-1807) 568 (Piscataqua River; the licensee was John
Langdon, one of the New Hampshire delegates to the Constitutional Convention,
Mar. 22, 1793) ; Mass. Sess. Laws, Jan. 1820, p. 421 (Piscataqua River bridge be-
tween Portsmouth, New Hampshire and Kittery); 3 PA. LAws (1791-1802) 200
(Delaware River bridge at Easton, Mar. 13, 1795); id. 336 (Delaware River
bridge at Trenton, April 4, 1798); 4 PA. LAWS (1802-08) 156 (Delaware River
bridge at Milford, Mar. 12, 1804); 5 PA. LAWs (1809-12) 111 (Delaware River
bridge in Bucks County, Mar. 19, 1810) ; 3 BREvAn's DIG. PUB. STAT. LAWS S. C.
419 (Savannah River bridge, 1801); id. 476 (same, at Augusta, Georgia, 1813).
"I lRv. STAT. Dz. (1829) 574 (Wilmington-Philadelphia road, Jan. 20, 1801) ;
Laws Ill. Terr. 1817-18, p. 36 (road from Vicennes to Belleville or St. Louis);
Ill. Laws 1819, p. 44 (Vincennes-St. Louis road); Ind. Laws 1822, p. 97 (road
from the Ohio line to Indianapolis) ; 2 MAss. LAws (1780-1807) 567 (Merrimack
River bridge on Andover-Methuen road to New Hampshire, Mar. 19, 1793) ; Ohio
Local Acts, 1st Sess. 1824, p. 116 (bridge on road between Zanesville and Wheel-
ing) ; 2 PA. LAws (1780-91) 332 (bridge on road between Philadelphia and Tren-
ton, Sept. 6, 1785) ; 2 LAWS TENN. 1820 (ed. Scott) 78 (Kentucky road, 1812) ;
Cf. 1 MAss. LAWS (1780-1807) 97 (repair of public bridges on roads leading to
New Hampshire authorized, Jan. 16, 1783); Rzv. LAWS N. J. (1820) 708 (for-
bidding construction of bridge across Delaware River between New Jersey and
Pennsylvania save after examination and approval of three freeholders, Mar. 1,1820o. 212 STAT. 457 (1808) (private corporation); 3 STAT. 583 (1820) (charter of
Washington, empowering the city "to erect and repair bridges").
1.. See statutes supra note 118.
... See 5 PA. LAWS (1809-12) 216 (acquiescing in New Jersey legislation for
erection of Delaware River bridge, Mar. 23, 1811).
122 See 3 PA. LAWS (1791-1802) 200 (Mar. 13, 1795); id. 336 (April 4, 1798);
4 PA. LAWs (1802-08) 156 (Mar. 12, 1804) ; 5 PA. LAWS 1809-12) 111 (Mar. 19,
1810).
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of protection to persons furnishing such facilities by expressly provid-
ing, in general ferry laws' 2 3 and in statutes granting specific ferry fran-
chises 24 on defined lines of interstate traffic or across boundary waters,
that no competing service should be set up or maintained within a
stated distance (ordinarily one or two miles) on either side of the
licensed enterprise. Occasionally the legislative judgment as to the
adequacy of the limited facilities thus afforded was stated in the oper-
ative statutes. 2 5 Intrusion on or interference with the monopoly posi-
tion thus created was declared to be an offense and sanctions were
provided. 2 6 The sporadic express exemption of postriders, permitting
them to keep boats for crossing rivers to avoid detention at ferries, with
the qualification that they should not transport any passengers across at
public ferries other than those who were traveling by stage 27 would
seem to suggest that this type of traffic was included under the general
laws and hence needed to be expressly mentioned if it were to receive
special treatment.
'Here and there attempts to mesh the ferry legislation of jurisdictions
facing each other across a boundary river were articulated. To pre-
serve the interests of inhabitants of the enacting state, the mandate
against issuing ferry licenses for points within a stated minimum dis-
tance of established ferries was declared inapplicable to points across
the river from an established ferry location in the adjoining state,1 28
while the latter's co-ordinate authority was recognized by according its
franchises equal validity with those of the enacting state under statutes
penalizing unauthorized ferrying. 2 9
The judgment embodied in the monopoly provisions of bridge and
ferry franchises was not merely a method of protecting property inter-
ests. The rights and conduct of travelers were also involved. To the
extent that such provisions restricted opportunity for exercise of a free
1-2 TomuN''s DIG. LAWS ALA. (1823) 391 (Dec. 21, 1820); Laws Ill. Terr.
1812, p. 40; Ind. Acts, 1817-18, p. 292; MOREHEAD & BROWN DIG. STAT. LAWS KY.
(1834) title 79 (Dec. 22, 1806) ; ibid. (Feb. 14, 1820) ; 1 DIG. LA. ACTs (1804-27)
474 (April 19, 1805) ; R. I. REv. LAWS (1822) 410; ci. 2 Ray. LAWS ME. (1821)
768; 1 LAWS MD. 1692-1839 (ed. Dorsey) 425 (Nov. 1799); LAWS DIST. & Tram.
LA. and Trom. & STATE Mo. (1842 ed.) 80 (July 9, 1806) ; id. 699 (Dec. 8, 1820) ;
Ohio Laws 1820, p. 171 (all prescribing penalty for keeping ferry and demanding
pay without authority).
' Ill. Laws 1819, p. 105 (Mississippi River ferry); Ill. Laws 1824, p. 79
(same) ; cf. 1 DIG. LA. Acrs (1804-27) 264 (exclusive ferry privilege across the
Mississippi at New Orleans, Mar. 18, 1820).
... See, e.g., preamble to Laws Ill. Terr. 1812, p. 40 ("Whereas ... at no one
point on either of those streams the Ohio and Mississippi is the crossing so fre-
quent as to warrant more than one ferry...").
"' TournMI's DIG. LA. ACTs (1823) 417 (Dec. 12, 1820) ; MOREHEAD & BRowN
DIG. STAT. LAWS Ky. (1834) title 79 (Jan. 16, 1813); CoMp. LAWS VT. (1824)
477 (Mar. 3, 1797) ; cf. 2 MAss. LAWS (1780-1807) 749 (Feb. 14, 1797) ; 1 N. C.
REv. LAWS (1821) 222 (penalizing false pretense of ferry privilege).
"271 N. C. REv. LAWS (1821) 569 (1787).
1 2 ODDEA & RWNDG STAT. LAWS Ky. (1834) title 79 (Dec. 22, 1806).
1 MOREHEAD & Bnowx DIG. STAT. LAWS Ky. (1834) title 79 (Jan. 16, 1813).
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choice between alternative services in crossing a river intersecting a
highway, they plainly constituted legislative intervention in the conditions
under which traffic moved along the highway. True, they were based
on the premise that by and large its movement would be promoted by
inducing greater alacrity in establishing such facilities and by eliminating
ruinous competition tending to the discontinuance or lackadaisical main-
tenance of established facilities. Without disputing the soundness of the
legislative choice of policy, one may nevertheless note that the election
to grant exclusive franchises necessarily involved a regulation of traffic
and travel, including that between states. Insofar as special considera-
tions at particular places called for a different treatment, the regulations
were adapted to them by the incorporation of provisos.130  If existing
arrangements did not seem adequately to care for the needs of the travel-
ing public, the legislatures reserved the right to repeal the limitation
in question' 31 despite the consequences of such repealer upon the for-
tunes of existing ferries'engaged in the business of furnishing interstate
communication.
In one particularly interesting case, the construction privilege was
granted to the proprietors of a line of stages between a city in the en-
acting state and one in an adjoining state and construction of a road,
bridge, and ferry constituting a substantial part of the route between
such cities by such company was authorized, so far as such route lay
within the enacting state.'
3 2
4. PRovisioNs OF COASTAL AND HAIRBOR IMPROVEMENTS
Ports and harbors constituted another item in the physical plant of
the nation's transportation system. Their location, like that of natural
watercourses, was fixed by the accidents of geology and not by legis-
lative response to practically articulate economic demands. But, again
like natural watercourses, their utility for purposes of navigation could
be either enhanced or diminished according to what was done to them.
A well-ordered system of waterfront improvements could materially
benefit shipping, while haphazard or accidental building could seriously
harm it. In undertaking the regulation of ports and harbors, then, the
state legislatures were acting with reference to a matter generically like
others which have already been considered.
130 See Laws 111. Terr. 1812, p. 41 (saving clause as to re-establishment of
named ferry at St. Louis, and continuance of established ferries authorized by
Indiana Territory, in statute prescribing generally the distance between ferries on
the Ohio and the Mississippi rivers); MOREHEAD & BROwN, DIG. STAT. LAWS Ky.
(1834) title 79 (towns excepted from provision for minimum distance between
ferry locations, Dec. 22, 1806, Feb. 14, 1820).131 Cf. Laws Ill. Terr. 1814, p. 50 (repealing two-miles-apart limitation pro-
vided for ferries across the Ohio and Mississippi rivers).
"112 PA. LAWS (1780-91) 332 (proprietors of Trenton-Philadelphia stages
authorized to build road between Philadelphia and Bristol, Pennsylvania, Sept. 6,
1785).
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Sometimes legislatures handled each case as one calling for inde-
pendent determination, conferring the power to erect particular docks or
wharves at named harbors on the littoral proprietors, 3 3 on designated
officials,13 4 or on harbor improvement companies constituted for the par-
ticular ports ;135 and local authorities were empowered to establish buoys
and channel markers.130 The provision of monuments and landmarks
on islands and rocks off the coast was occasionally confided to local
semi-official organizations connected with navigation13' Other legisla-
tures refrained from exercising control over the erection of wharves,
the establishment of harbor lines, and the repair of docks directly, en-
trusting the regulation of such matters to the local authorities of the
principal seaport towns instead' 38-an indication that it was viewed by
and large as a matter of municipal administration; and this was the
method which commended itself to Congress in legislating for the Dis-
trict of Columbia.139 When negative rather than affirmative measures
for harbor improvement were needed, the states were more likely to
handle the matter directly, by providing for the clearance of obstructions
from the port or harbor' 40 or by condemning their erection or main-
tenance.' 4 '
The provision of harbor facilities seems not to have been deemed a
matter peculiarly and exclusively of state, as contrasted with federal,
competence, however, in the manner most of the matters heretofore con-
S83 See 3 MAss. LAWS (1780-1807) 371 (June 23, 1806) ; cf. 4 PA. LAws (1802-
08) 405 (specification of character of wharves allowable in Southwark, directing
manner of permissible construction and alteration of existing piers to conform to
legislation, April 7, 1807).
132 PA. LAws (1780-91) 24 (borough of Southwark, Sept. 20, 1782) ; 4 PA.
LAws (1802-08) 244 (Delaware River waterfront of Philadelphia, April 1, 1805).
I'l 2 MAss. LAWS (1780-1807) 553 (June 27, 1792) ; id. 800 (Feb. 2, 1796) ; 3
MAss. LAWS (1780-1807) 306 (June 14, 1805); 4 MAss. LAWS (1807-16) 27
(Mar. 8, 1808) ; id. 88 (June 17, 1809); id. 111 (Mar. 1, 1810); id. 197 (Feb. 25,
1811); id. 388 (Feb. 22, 1814) ; Ohio Local Acts, 1st Sess. 1824, p. 45.
1 BREvAus DIG. PuR. STAT. LAWS S. C. 414 (1791).
1873 MAss. LAWS (1780-1807) 392 (Marine Society of Marblehead, Feb. 25,
18 3
.See REV. STAT. DEL. (1829) 682 (charter of Wilmington, June 13, 1772);
R1v. CODE MISS. (1824) 628 (Natchez, Jan. 26, 1821) ; LAWS DIST. & TERn. LA.
and Tnam. & STATE Mo. (1842 ed.) 967 (charter of St. Louis, Dec. 9, 1822) ; Rzv.
LAWS N. J. (1820) 66 (charter of Perth Amboy, Dec. 21, 1784) ; id. 73 (charter
of Burlington, Dec. 21, 1784) ; Ohio Local Acts, 1st Sess. 1825, p. 59 (charter of
Marietta); R. I. Ray. LAWS (1822) 484 (Providence); 3 BREVARD'S DIG. Pun.
STAT. LAWS S. C. 21 (charter of Beaufort, 1803) ; id. 36 (charter of Charleston,
1783); id. 140 (charter of Georgetown, 1805); cf. Ohio Sess. Laws, Ist Sess.
1827, p. 40 (charter of Cincinnati, authorizing city to construct wharves and
docks) ; 4 PA. LAWS (1802-08) 67 (Board of Wardens for the Port of Philadel-
phia given supervision of extension of wharves, Mar. 29, 1803); id. 232 (licensing
of building of wharves and fences in the Schuylkill River to be by the Port War-
dens, Mar. 15, 1805).
"12 STAT. 332 (1805) (charter of Georgetown) ; 3 STAT. 583 (1820) (charter
of Washington).
1402 N. C. REv. LAWS (1821) 1395 (port of Washington, 1816); 8 PA. LAWS
(1822-25) 145 (harbor of Presque Isle, Mar. 21, 1823).
1 I N. Y. Rrv. STAT. (1827-28) 686 (New York Bay).
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sidered appear to have been regarded, for there were instances of
cessions of public piers and sites for the erection of public piers by the
state legislatures to Congress. 142 Congressional provision was made for
the erection of piers in coastal rivers but conditioned on obtaining a
cession of sovereignty to the United States by the state.143  Protection
of such federally installed harbor improvements would seem on the
other hand to have been looked upon as a matter to be handled by the
states.1
44
There was one class of works intimately connected with the carry-
ing trade, the control of which the states virtually abdicated in favor of
the central government. That was the lighthouse system. Prior to the
adoption of the Constitution in 1787, a number of lighthouses were being
maintained by states but, starting almost contemporaneously with the
new government, these were ceded to the United States145 and so also
from time to time thereafter were sites for the erection of additional
lighthouses.1 4 6 This series of cessions was matched by a corresponding
series of acceptances expressed in Congressional statutes. Indeed, one
of the earliest acts of the first Congress had been for the establishment
of lighthouses, beacons, buoys, and public piers.1 47  Thereafter there
were frequent manifestations of federal activity in this field, with Con-
gressional enactments as to designated localities for the installation
within or adjacent to the territorial waters and harbors of the several
states of buoys, 1 48 beacons, 149 and lighthouses.1 50 However, the cessions
by the states were not the absolute relinquishments that might have been
expected had the grantors regarded themselves as deprived of power in
the premises by the adoption of the Constitution or the enactment of
federal statutes., Instead they were conditioned on the allowance of
equivalent compensation to that accorded to other states thereafter for
similar grants, should compensation in any case be allowed,151 and fur-
thermore by provision for reversion to the state if the United States
should in the future fail to keep the ceded lighthouses properly repaired
and lighted, 152 a provision rather clearly indicating a conviction that the
142 See, e.g., REv. STAT. DEL. (1829) 672, 673 (Jan. 29, 1791; Jan. 11, 1803;
Feb. 1, 1827).1482 STAT. 150 (1802) (Delaware River).
Cf. R. L Rv. LAWS (1822) 423 (prescribing penalties for fastening vessels
to or running them against stakes or buoys set out in the waters of the state by
the United States).
15 1av. STAT. DEL. (1829) 672 (Jan. 29, 1791); 1 MAss. LAWS (1780-1807)
494 (June 10, 1790).
148 See, e.g., TOULmIN'S Dio. LAWS ALA. (1823) 862 (Dec. 20, 1820).
1471 STA. 53 (1789).
14I 1 STAT. 353 (1794) ; idZ. 516 (1797) ; idZ. 540 (1798) ; idZ. 553 (same) ; 2
STAT. 270 (1804) ; id. 476 (1808) ; 3 STAT. 534 (1819).1401 STAT. 730 (1799); 2 STAT. 476 (1808) ; 3 STAT. 534 (1819).
1 STAT. 540 (1798); id. 553 (same); 2 STAT. 150 (1802); id. 270 (1804);
id. 476 (1808) ; 3 STAT. 534 (1819).
1.1 1 MASS. LAws (1780-1807) 494 (June 10, 1790). 152 Ibid.
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states regarded the subject as one still within their competence should
they deem it necessary or desirable to resume its superintendence.
The inlets, coves, and petty tributary streams along the seacoast
formed part of the navigable waters; and sometimes as to these the
states acted in much the same manner as they did with regard to navi-
gable interior watercourses beyond tidewater-providing for survey of
the coasts and erection of beacons, 153 directing the staking of channels
between particular places along the seacoast,154 and making provision
for removal of obstructions from such waters in the same manner as
from interior watercourses 5 5 or incorporating companies for naviga-
tion improvement at such places. 5 6
Nevertheless the states felt no compulsion to refrain from interfer-
ing with natural conditions in this connection for the benefit of those
at sea to the prejudice of those on land. Occasionally a generalized
procedure was established by statute for the reclamation and develop-
ment of lands bordering the sea, by the draining and ditching of low-
lands and marshes and the damming of streams.15 7  A compromise be-
tween the competing interests in navigation and in reclamation was
effected by distinguishing between those creeks which might and those
which might not be shut up, on the basis of their capacity for accom-
modating or permitting the passage qf watercraft of a prescribed char-
acter.158 Again privileges for coastal improvements, including the
construction and maintenance of requisite dams, were individually
granted ;159 and permission was given to build milldams in tidal creeks in
harbors. 16 0 Routes for intercourse primarily interstate or international
in character were accorded no necessary primacy over those devoted
almost exclusively to the movement of the internal traffic of the state.
1 N. C. Rnv. LAws (1821) 527 (1785).
Ibid. (Beaufort to the Neuse River).
"' See 1 DIG. LA. AcTs (1804-27) 542 (Bayou Plaquemine, Mar. 7, 1820); 1
N. C. REv. LAWS (1821) 348 (Currituck Inlet, 1777) ; id. 487 (Bogue Inlet, 1784);
3 BREvAiw's DiG. PuB. STAT. LAWS S. C. 1240 (1738).
""2 N. C. REv. LAWS (1821) 1526 (Ocracoke Inlet, 1820) ; TAYLOR'S RmSAL,
N. C. REv. LAWS (1821-25) 12 (deepening channel in Pamlico Sound, 1821).
"" PuB. STAT. CONx. (1824) 365; 2 MASS. LAWS (1780-1807) 721 (Feb. 26,
1796); Rv. LAWS N. J. (1820) 82 (Nov. 29, 1788); id. 128 (Nov. 24, 1792);
Cf. 1 PA. LAWS (1700-80) 168 (proviso permitting erection of such structures, in
general law forbidding obstructions in streams, Aug. 14, 1725).
. See REv. LAWS N. J. (1820) 82 (navigability for shallops carrying eight
cords of wood, Nov. 29, 1788).
"" 1 MAss. LAWS (1780-1807) 463 (Feb. 17, 1789); ef. REv. LAWS N. J.
(1820) 811 (listing private acts authorizing and regulating the construction and
maintenance of dams, banks, and sluices); TAYLoies REVIsAL, N. C. REv. LAWS
(1821-25) 26 (incorporating Roanoke Inlet Company with authority to make
embankments across Roanoke and Croatan sounds and to stop up the navigation
through Croatan Sound, 1821); 1 PA. LAws (1700-80) 227 (April 12, 1760); 3
PA. LAWS (1791-1802) 206 (Mar. 31, 1795) ; id. 279 (Mar. 4, 1797) ; 4 PA. LAWS
(1802-08) 159 (Mar. 19, 1804) (all authorizing the damming of marshland streams
communicating with the Delaware River).
"'83 MASS. LAWS (1780-1807) 123 (Mar. 7, 1803).
[Vol.2
COMMERCE REGULATION
Thus, in granting authority to construct the Cape Cod Canal, Massa-
chusetts conditioned her permission on the erection of toll bridges to
connect the neighborhood highways on the Cape.' 6 '
5. INTERSTATE TELEGRAPH LINES
The sense of anomaly which today's reader experiences in finding the
problem of government control of railroads0 2 bruited while signers of
the Contsitution were still alive will be matched, perhaps exceeded, by
contemporary appearance of the question of interstate communication by
telegraph. Tantalizingly brief and ambiguous, the references may well
be quoted in full and followed by one or two cautious observations. They
consist of materials from two sources, one the proceedings of Congress,
the other the statutes of Pennsylvania.
The earlier materials, from the federal House of Representatives,
open With the following episode of December 22, 1807:1103
Mr. Crowninshield said it would be acknowledged by all that the
prompt communication of information along the coast, to different
parts of the country would be extremely advantageous at any
time; perhaps it was more proper to be considered at this moment,
than at any time since the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, which
established our Independence. It was true that the United States
had a mail running from each extreme of the continent to the
other; but information could not, through the medium of the mail,
be conveyed with the expedition which a telegraph would afford to
important intelligence. This had been acknowledged by almost all
Governments; and in France, Spain, and England they had been
found of great utility. There had been a telegraph in this coun-
try, from the Vineyard to Boston, a distance of about seventy
miles; and communications could be made by it between those
places in one hour. Calculating from this act, information might
be communicated from Norfolk to the Seat of Government in two
hours, and from Washington to New York or Boston in three or
four hours. To bring this subject before the House, he should
offer the- following resolution: "Resolved, that it is expedient to
authorize the President of the United States to establish such
telegraphs, along the coasts and in other situations in the United
States as he may deem proper." Mr. C. said as this was a subject
which might require some discussion, being so little known, he
should not now press its decision, but moved that the resolution
be referred to a Committee of the Whole tomorrow. After some
conversation on the propriety of a reference to a Committee of
... Mass. Sess. Laws, Jan. 1818, p. 560.16 2Supra note 28.
" 17 ANNALs OF CoNGRFss 1223, 1224 (1882).
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the Whole in preference to a select committee, the reference pro-
posed by the mover of the resolution was agreed to.
The matter was reopened after the Christmas recess in the following
manner on January 4, 1808 :164
Mr. Crowninshield presented to the House a memorial and peti-
tion of Jonathan Grout, of the State of Massachusetts, stating that
he is the inventor of the art of communicating intelligence by tele-
graph, to a much greater extent, than has heretofore been known or
practised in any part of the world; and praying that some person
may be authorized on behalf of the United States to contract with
him for the establishment of such line or lines of telegraphs, for the
purpose of conveying intelligence of public or Governmental con-
cern; or that such other contract on behalf of the public may be
made with your petitioner, as may seem meet and proper.
Thereupon the petition was referred to a select committee of the
House,165 and on March 30th 8 6
The committee to whom was referred the memorial of Jonathan
Grout, relative to telegraphs, was discharged from the further con-
sideration of the subject, and it was referred to the Secretary of
the Treasury, to report thereon to the next session of Congress.
What, if any, recommendations were made does not appear. At any rate,
no Congressional action in aid of Mr. Grout is revealed anywhere in
the pages of the Statutes at Large. However that may be, he apparently
obtained funds or an assurance of fuids adequate to buoy his hopes
from some quarter for, turning now to state materials, the following
statute quoted in toto with its preamble, was adopted on March 24, 1809,
by the Pennsylvania legislature :167
Whereas Jonathan Grout has erected a line of telegraphs from
Philadelphia to Port Penn, in the state of Delaware, for the pur-
pose of transmitting the earliest possible intelligence from the Dela-
ware Bay to Philadelphia, and vice versa, and has petitioned this
legislature, stating that the south half of Reedy Island at the head
of the Delaware Bay in said state, owned by this Commonwealth,
is so situated that if a telegraph were erected thereon its position
would ensure an earlier conveyance of intelligence through such
line than could be effected from any other place in that vicinity,
that it will conduce to the extension of such line to the Capes of the
Delaware Bay, which is laudable and promotive of public good:
Therefore, Section 1., Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in General
20' Id. 1271. 265 Id. 1272.
1818 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1874 (1882).
"'15 PA. LAWS (1809-12) 39.
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Assembly met, and it is hereby enacted by the authority of the
same, That the use of all that part of Reedy Island, the property
of this Commonwealth, be, and hereby is granted unto Jonathan
Grout, his heirs and assigns, being citizens of the United States,
as a telegraphic station until otherwise directed by law.
There the matter rests. The next emergence of the telegraph in
American history is associated with the name of Morse, not with that
of Grout, and with the nomination of Polk rather than with the admin-
istration of Jefferson. The chief constitutional significance of the Con-
gressional proceedings quoted is the intimate linking of the subject of
telegraphs with that of the mails, and the utter absence of any language
remotely allusive to the commerce clause in the course of the discussion;
also the reference of the subject to a select committee and not to the
already well established standing Committee on Commerce and Manu-
factures, thus implying elements of constitutional or other novelty and
making manifest a total lack of consciousness of relationship between
telegraphic communication and interstate commerce a then understood.
The Pennsylvania legislation, while making it crystal clear that the enter-
prise involved the transmission of interstate messages, is blurred in its
implications by the fact that the direct object was a cession of state
property and hence peculiarly a matter of state concern under any view
of the distribution of legislative competence between the states and the
United States. But the reservation of power to alter the conditions of
the grant may conceivably, by a perhaps somewhat strained construction,
suggest an uncomplicated assumption of state power freely to control
interstate communication enterprises.
6. CONDITION OF, AND STANDARDS FOR, TRANSPORTATION
CHANNELS
It was not alone in connection with the establishment or authorization
of the land and water routes that governmental action was called for.
The adequacy as well as the existence of the transportation plant was a
matter of concern. This involved a definition of the qualitative aspects
of transportation facilities, implemented by protective legislation to dis-
courage conduct injurious to them. A review of the legislation in this
respect discloses a pattern strikingly similar to that heretofore noted in
connection with the establishment of the plant.
The width of the highways was often specified.1 68 Detailed rules
1
""Tour.,n's DIG. LAWS ALA. (1823) 391 (Dec. 21, 1820); REv. STAT. DEL.
(1829) 465 (Feb. 10, 1829); id. 647 (Nov. 2, 1762); PRiNcE's DIG. LAWS GA.
(1819) 399 (Dec. 4, 1799); Ill. Laws 1819, p. 119; I1. Laws 1822-23, p. 88;
LAWS INDIANA TEmR. 1809-16 (ed. Ewbank & Piker) 248 (Dec. 17, 1811); Ind.
Acts 1817-18, p. 274; Ind. Laws 1819, p. 110; Ind. Laws 1821, p. 167; MoREHEAD
& B3RowN DIG. STAT. LAWS Ky. (1834) title 154 (Dec. 11, 1801); 2 DIG. LA. Acrs
(1804-27) 314 (Mar. 12, 1818); 2 MAss. LAWS (1780-1807) 745 (Nov. 25, 1796);
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regarding construction in other respects, including grade, crown, founda-
tion, and surfacing, were set forth for public highwaysI10 and turnpike
roads. 1 °0 These specifications, ranging from comparatively excellent to
exceptionally crude,17 1 may be taken as reflecting the legislative judg-
ment as to what, in view of the resources available for construction and
the nature and amount of the potential traffic, was an appropriate pro-
vision for the accommodation of carriers and travelers. If turnpikes
were suffered to fall into disrepair, the proprietors, during the contin-
uance of that condition, were forbidden to demand tolls.' 7 2  Tentative
efforts towards uniformity may be found occasionally, as in legislation
providing that when one of the contiguous states should prescribe the
building of a road of a stipulated width up to the state line, connecting
roads within the enacting state should be widened to correspond.17 3 For
the guidance of the traveler, provisions with respect to the marking of
the roads with mileposts and intersection guide signs were common. 174
3 MASS. LAws (1780-1807) 285 (Mar. 16, 1805); REv. CODE Miss. (1824) 357;
LAWS or DIST. & TEmi. LA. and TRam. & STARE Mo. (1842 ed.) 323 (Jan. 18,
1814); id. 952 (Dec. 3, 1822); Ray. LAWS N. J. (1820) 615 (Feb. 9, 1818); 1
REv. STAT. N. Y. (1827-8) 517; id. 582; 1 N. C. Rxv. LAws (1821) 515 (1784);
OHIO LAws 1820, 2nd Part, 284 (Jan. 7, 1811); 3 PA. LAWs (1791-1802) 82(April 9, 1792); id. 232 (April 17, 1795); id. 512 (April 6, 1802); 4 PA. LAWS
(1802-08) 141 (Mar. 5, 1804); id. 532 (Mar. 28, 1808); 5 PA. LAWs (1809-12)
280 (Jan. 17, 1812); 6 McCoRD STAT. AT LARGE S. C. 310 (Dec. 18, 1827); 1
LAWS TENN. 1820 (ed. Scott) 819 (Aug. 4, 1804); 2 LAWS TENN. 1820 (ed.
Scott) 78 (Nov. 20, 1811) ; id. 242 (Nov. 14, 1815) ; 2 VA. RrV. CODE (1819) 211
(Feb. 7, 1817).
I 9 PgiNcE's DIG. LAWS GA. (1819) 399 (Dec. 4, 1799); Ind. Laws 1821, p.
167; LAWS OF DIsr. & TERo. LA. and TEmi. & STATE Mo. (1842 ed.) 323 (Jan.
18, 1814); 1 LAWS TENIN. 1820 (ed. Scott) 819 (Aug. 4, 1804).
...Ill. Laws 1819, p. 119; Ill. Laws 1824, p. 88; 1 REV. STAT. N. Y. (1827-28)
582; OHIO LAWS 1820, 2nd Part, 284 (Jan. 7, 1811); 3 PA. LAWS (1791-
1802) 82 (April 9, 1792); 4 PA. LAWs (1802-08) 27 (Mar. 24, 1803); id. 141(Mar. 5, 1804); 5 PA. LAWS (1809-12) 280 (Jan. 17, 1812); 6 McCoRD STAT. AT
LARGE S. C. 310 (Dec. 18, 1827); 2 REv. CODE VA. (1819) 211 (Feb. 7, 1817).
1"1 Compare Ill. Laws 1819, p. 119 ("twenty-eight feet of which shall be based
. with stone or other hard substance, well compacted together, and of sufficient
depth to secure a good foundation ... and faced with gravel or broken stone, of a
depth not less than nine inches ... rising in the middle by a gradual arch") with
LAWS OF DIST. & Tram. LA. and TEro. & STATE Mo. (1842 ed.) 343 ("such limbs
of trees as may incommode horsemen shall be cut away and no stump shall exceed
twelve inches in height") and Ind. Laws 1821, p. 167. It is to be noted that, quite
consistently, requirements were stricter as to turnpikes than as to public highways.
172 REv. CODE VA. (1819) 211 (Feb. 7, 1817).
"' LAWS INDIANA TER. 1809-16 (ed. Ewbank & Piker) 687 (road at Ohio
line, width of twenty-five feet, Dec. 18, 1815).1
'TouLMIN's DIG. LAWS ALA. (1823) 391 (Dec. 21, 1820) ; Pun. STAT. CONN.
(1824) 332; PRINceS DIG. LAWS GA. (1819) 401 (Dec. 19, 1818) ; Ill. Laws 1819,
p. 120; LAWS INDIANA TERR. 1801-09 (ed. Philbrick) 427 (Sept. 17, 1807) ; Ind.
Acts 1817-18, p. 282; Ind. Laws 1821, p. 167; MOREHEAD & BROWN DIG. STAT. LAWS
Ky. (1834) title 154 (Feb. 25, 1797); 2 REV. LAWS ME. (1821) 526; 2 MASS.
LAWS (1780-1807) 669 (Feb. 28, 1795); REv. CODE Miss. (1824) 350; 1 LAWS
DIST. N TER. LA. AND TEam. & STATE Mo. (1832 ed.) 548 (Feb. 1, 1817); CoMp.
LAWS N. H. (1830) 584 (Dec. 16, 1792); R v. LAws N. J. (1820) 615 (Feb. 9,
1818); 1 REv. STAT. N. Y. (1827-28) 503; id. 582; 1 N. C. REv. LAWS (1821)
515 (1784); LAWS OHIO, 2nd Part (1820) 207; id. 286 (Jan. 7, 1811); 3 PA.
LAWS (1791-1802) 82 (April 9, 1792) ; 4 PA. LAWS (1802-08) 7 (Feb. 11, 1803) ;
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Where the Federal Government undertook the establishment of roads,
it directed the details of their construction as to dimensions, specifica-
tions, and the like175 but, where it authorized the extension of state
turnpikes through the District of Columbia, it was apt to incorporate by
reference the specifications and conditions laid down by the chartering
state for the portion of the turnpike within its borders. 176
Comparable provisions were inserted in canal legislation. Water-
ways of that character were required to be of stipulated dimensions,177
which were sometimes defined by reference to the character of the traffic
which it was anticipated might use the canal.'78
There was rather less occasion for governmental supervision of the
character and condition of harbors and navigable waterways, since navi-
gability itself was a standard of some definiteness. Nevertheless the
states freely undertook the exercise of whatever control was necessary
in this connection. It was they who granted the privilege of erecting
dams in indisputably navigable interstate waterways, although in so
doing it was customary to condition the grant upon the requirement
that the dam should not interfere with the navigation. 179 The condition
itself probably demonstrates the then navigable character of the stream
affected, perhaps even its actual contemporary use for purposes of navi-
id. 27 (Mar. 24, 1803); 5 PA. LAws (1809-12) 280 (Jan. 17, 1812); R. I. Rrv.
LAws (1882) 439 (1798); 1 LAws TENN. 1820 (ed. Scott) 821 (Aug. 4, 1804);
2 REv. CODE VA. (1819) 211 (Feb. 7, 1817).1 2 STAT. 357 (1806); 3 STAT. 5 (1813); id. 12 (same).
182 STAT. 808 (1813); 3 STAT. 391 (1817); id. 482 (1819).
177Ill. Laws 1824, p. 160; Ind. Special Acts 1823, p. 81.8 See Ind. Special Acts 1823, p. 81 ("of a sufficient width to admit the pas-
sage of steamboats").
1"7 Toum i's DIG. LAWS ALA. (1823) 713 (Tennessee River, Dec. 3, 1821);
Ill. Laws 1819, p. 202 (Kaskaskia River); id. 296 (Cash River); 3 MASS. LAWS
(1780-1807) 365 (Quincy Town River, June 23, 1806) ; 4 MAss. LAws (1807-16)
360 (Taunton River, June 14, 1813); 3 REV. STAT. N. Y. (1827-28) (Delaware
River, 1828); id. 274 (Harlem River, 1813); id. 275 (Hudson River, 1804); id.
276, 277 (Susquehanna River, 1809, 1811, 1822) ; id. 279 (Newtown Creek, 1806) ;
3 PA. LAWS (1791-1802) 201 (Juniata River, Mar. 13, 1795); 4 PA. LAWS (1802-
08) 20 (general authorizing act, Mar. 23, 1803) ; cf. Laws Ill. Terr. 1817-18, p. 25
(Kaskaskia River) ; Ind. Laws 1822, p. 15 (White River, manner of construction
prescribed); Ind. Special Acts 1823, p. 46 (declaring Blue River a navigable
stream and requiring all dams therein to be built or altered so as to admit the
passage of boats); MOREHEAD & BROWN DIG. STAT. LAWS Ky. (1834) title 123
(general statute, county courts in authorizing construction of mill dams to impose
on applicants such conditions as they see fit to prevent obstruction of navigation,
Feb. 22, 1797) ; 1 MASS. LAWS (1780-1807) 455 (log boom across Androscoggin
River, Feb. 17, 1789) ; id. 487 (same, across Merrimack River, Feb. 22, 1790) ; 3
MASS. LAWS (1780-1807) 50 (same, across Saco River, Feb. 26, 1802); id. 265
(same, Mar. 11, 1805) ; Mass. Sess. Laws, May 1818, p. 49 (same, across Penob-
scot River) ; 1 PA. LAWS (1700-80) 235 (navigation commissioners of Schuylkill
River authorized, inter alia, to construct dams to improve the navigation, Mar. 14,
1761) ; id. 322 (same as to Delaware and Lehigh rivers, Mar. 9, 1771) ; id. 324
(same as to Susquehanna, Juniata, and other named rivers, Mar. 9, 1771) ; 3 PA.
LAWS (1791-1802) 127 (reserving right to maintain dams on interstate stream
declared a public highway on condition they be so constructed as not to interfere
with the navigation, April 8, 1794).
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gation. The initiation or completion of levee projects along navigable
rivers was prohibited unless consent thereto was first obtained from the
proper authorities. 80 Except for structures connected with the work-
ing of machines or engines useful to the public, every dam, weir, or
other obstruction placed in navigable streams which might interfere with
free navigation was abatable as a nuisance' 8 ' and the person erecting
or maintaining it was subject to fine.'8 2 Again, it was provided that any
one making any work tending to alter the course or increase the rapidity
of navigable streams or to make their navigation more difficult or to
embarrass public use, by works constructed on their banks, should be
subjected to fine.' 83 The unreasonable detention of logs by owners of
booms in the rivers of the state, including interstate rivers, was dealt
with in like manner.18 4 Supervision of the cleaning of docks and of
regulations respecting the use of wharves was frequently vested in local
authorities under municipal charters or local laws, 8 5 including those
provided by Congress for the government of the District of Columbia,'8 8
and fences or buildings on established public landing places were de-
clared public nuisances subject to abatement. 8 7
A bridge, while a highway improvement, is almost unavoidably a
waterway obstruction or, at least, an alteration of natural conditions
potentially capable of adversely affecting navigation along the stream,
should there then or thereafter be any navigation. By the simple ad-
monition that a bridge whose construction was authorized should be so
built as not to obstruct the navigation, the legislatures sometimes shifted
the burden of initial determination to the licensee.' 88 In other instances
they were not satisfied with this glib evasion of the difficulty. Failing
the use of some such formula, however, a legislature before authorizing
a bridge was faced with the necessity of deciding, presumably in the
light of the stream's actual or probable use for navigation, what were
the limits within which the interests of those engaged in navigation
1801 DIG. LA. ACTS (1804-27) 651 (Feb. 15, 1808).
181 See, e.g., MOREHEAD & BROWN DIG. STAT. LAWS Ky. (1834) title 123 (Feb.
22, 1797); 1 LAWS MD. 1692-1839 (ed. Dorsey) 80 (Mar. 1734); id. 85 (May
1747); id 116 (Potomac River, May 1768); cf. 2 Rav. CODE VA. (1819) 235(1815).
182 MOREHEAD & BROWN DIG. STAT. LAWS Ky. (1834) title 125 (Feb. 10, 1816).
18"1 DIG. LA. AcTs (1804-27) 651 (Feb. 15, 1808).
12 RFv. LAWS ME. (1821) 749.
18 REV. STAT. DEL. (1829) 675 (charter of Wilmington, Jan. 31, 1809) ; 3 PA.
LAws (1791-1802) 274 (county commissioners authorized to regulate landings and
wharves in Northern Liberties, April 4, 1796) ; 3 BREVA D's DIG. PUB. STAT. LAWS
S. C. 14 (charter of Georgetown, 1805).
1883 STAT. 583 (1820) (charter of Washington).
1871 REv. LAWS ME. (1821) 107.
188 See Ill. Laws 1819, p. 44; id. 365; Ill. Laws 1820-21, p. 145; Ill. Laws 1822-
23, p. 200; 2 DIG. LA. Acs (1804-27) 314 (Mar. 12, 1818); 3 PA. LAws (1791-
1802) 274 (April 4, 1796) ; id. 290 (April 28, 1797) ; id. 312 (Mar. 16, 1798) ; cf.




should be recognized and protected. Every measure for the building of
a bridge over a navigable stream, if it did not take refuge in the vaguely
general proviso, rested upon a preliminary determination that the poten-
tial degree was to be in some degree hindered or excluded. 8 9 Where,
in the light of changes in the extent and character of the water traffic
using a stream, the draws originally provided proved insufficient, the
state might direct that they be enlarged to accommodate the vessels sail-
ing those waters, specifying the requirements to be satisfied ;110 and con-
versely it might, if it deemed proper, dispense with the need for maintain-
ing a drawbridge and authorize the erection of a simple fixed bridge of
stationary construction. 191
The width of the channel was a factor in navigability and this the
legislatures could and quite commonly did care for in the legislative
authorization of particular bridges by prescribing the minimum permis-
sible span from pier to pier. Another factor was that of height; here,
too, the device of a legislative prescription of a minimum clearance was
available and was often employed. 19 2 As to this, however, an alternative
was available which gave even further recognition to the interests of
water carriers-indeed literally made the sky the limit; this was to
stipulate for the erection of a drawbridge, a method of handling the
problem which was in frequent use. 93 But this solution meant that
those who wished to travel along the highway could not do so when the
bridge was up nor those desirous of travelling along the stream when it
was down. Reconciliation of their conflicting demands was treated as
an appropriate area for state legislation which, on occasion, went so far
in the interests of highway traffic as to forbid the raising of the bridge
at certain hours,19 4 thus effectively barring river travel for the time.
Persons having charge of bridges who should leave their draws open
for longer than a fixed time, except when actually necessary for the
180 Compare REv. STAT. DEL. (1829) 566 (bridge to be constructed to permit the
passage of scows and similar boats without masts. Jan. 16, 1798) with id. 581
(authorizing construction of drawbridge to permit the entrance of masted vessels,
Jan. 20, 1807) ; cf. 2 PA. LAWS (1780-91) 332 (bridge to be so built that boats
and shallops might pass without delay, Sept. 6, 1785).
190 See Comp. Pun. LAws N. J. (1833) 186 (enlargement of bridge draws of
bridges over Hackensack River below tidewater, Mar. 3, 1828); 3 PA. LAws
(1791-1802) 278 (reserving right to maintain present drawbridge over a stream
declared a public highway, until another should be erected, but authorizing those
interested in the navigation to enlarge the draw to a stated maximum, Feb. 27,
1797).
181 See 1 PA. LAWs (1700-80) 466 (reconstruction of bridge at Chester, Sept.
3, 1778).
10I See, e.g., REv. STAT. DEL. (1829) 566 (Feb. 2, 1802) ; PiuNcE's DIG. LAWS
GA. (1819) 399 (Dec. 4, 1799); 1 PA. LAWS (1700-80) 466 (Sept. 3, 1778); 4
PA. LAws (1802-08) 297 (Mar. 10, 1806).
1 '"See, e.g., REv. STAT. DEL. (1829) 567 (Jan. 30, 1813); id. 569 (Nov. 6,
1773) ; 1 DIG. LA. AcTs (1804-27) 134 (Feb. 18, 1817).
... PUB. STAT. CONN. (1824) 222 (Connecticut River bridge at Hartford to be
closed from five a.m. to eight a.m.).
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passage of vessels, were to be fined.'0 5 On notification by a ship of its
desire to pass, the draw on the bridge was to be opened promptly.
10
It was made the duty of bridge proprietors to see to the removal of
driftwood and other obstructions to navigation collecting at the base of
the bridge. 10 7
As an accommodation to the Federal Government, when it was inter-
ested for naval or other reasons in the navigability of a particular stream,
a state might assent to the application of the United States to make a
draw in a bridge spanning the stream but, in doing so, prescribe the
character of the draw which was to be made.1 8 A state which joined
with another in authorizing a toll bridge over a boundary river yet
seems to have retained the power to prescribe independently details as
to the construction and character of the bridge as a condition to its
assent, a point illustrated by the requirement in one case by one par-
ticipating state that bridge lamps be provided.10 9
There might also be a conflict of interests between land travelers
and water traffic at established ferries, since the method of their opera-
tion in some cases was to have the ferry boats towed over by ropes from
one bank to the other. Accordingly as to some rivers, it was provided
by state legislation that masted vessels sailing along them should be so
constructed that their masts could be lowered on coming to a ferry and
that such action should be taken 2 0 or, if a boat or raft were so loaded
that it could not pass under the ropes, notice of its approach should be
given the ferry keeper in sufficient time to care for the raising or lower-
ing of the ropes so as to permit the passage of the watercraft.20 1
Only as to bridges in the District of Columbia 2 did Congress under-
take to lay down rules with respect to their construction, maintenance,
and operation, in matters affecting river traffic.
Except for the provisions entrusting the regulation of ferries to the
same local authorities who had charge of their licensing, adopted by a
few states, 203 prescriptions of the character and condition of ferry serv-/
ice tended to follow a stereotyped pattern. Customarily it was required
that a suitable boat be provided; that competent ferrymen be in charge;
"' REv. LAws N. J. (1820) (maximum of fifteen minutes, bridges over Hack-
ensack River or English Creek, Mar. 16, 1796).
4 PA. LAwS (1802-08) 347 (Mar. 31, 1806).
1971 DiG. LA. AcTs (1804-27) 134 (Feb. 18, 1817).
198 Mass. Sess. Laws, May 1817, p. 443 (Charles River bridge).
... Mass. Sess. Laws, Jan. 1820, p. 421.
" 1 PA. LAWS (1700-80) 266 (Feb. 8, 1766).
20 1 PA. LAWS (1700-80) 266 (Feb. 8, 1766) ; 4 PA. LAWS (1802-08) 347 (sig-
nal by horn, Mar. 31, 1806).202Cf. 2 STAT. 457 (1808).
2
'MOREHEAD & BROWN DIG. STAT. LAWS Ky. (1834) title 79 (Dec. 22, 1806);
2 REv. LAWS ML. (1821) 768; 1 LAws MD. 1692-1839 (ed. Dorsey) 175 (May
1781); Rrv. LAWS N. J. (1820) 66 (charter of Perth Amboy, Dec. 21, 1784); id.
73 (charter of Burlington, Dec. 31, 1784) ; Ohio Sess. Acts, 1st Sess. 1827, p. 46
(charter of Cincinnati); CoMP. LAWS Vr. (1824) 477 (Mar. 3, 1797).
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and that they be in attendance to transport travelers at stated (or at
reasonable) hours.204 Increased facilities were required where special
considerations relative to the probable needs of the traffic to be served
indicated that that be done.205 The grant of the ferry privilege might
be conditioned upon the use of stipulated kinds of motive power in the
operation of the projected ferry.20 6 The wharf, or ferry slip, and land-
ing place must be maintained in good order.2 7  A pre-Revolutionary
enactment requiring public bridge or ferry keepers to take out licenses
as taverners 2 8 was not duplicated in any subsequent legislation, perhaps
because conditions had so changed that it was no longer necessary that
taverns be maintained as an adjunct to such facilities, perhaps because,
in case there was a genuine need for a combination of the services, the
persons having bridge or ferry franchises provided it without statutory
compulsion. Passengers unreasonably delayed might recover a penalty
from the keeper of the ferry.209 The provision occasionally adopted as
to ferries over state boundary rivers that ferry keepers might take up
passengers on either side of the stream is an extreme example of state
regulation.2 10
Occasionally criminal legislation aimed at securing navigation or
transportation facilities from harm was cast in broad and inclusive terms,
penalizing, for example, the destruction or injury of turnpike fixtures
or navigation works.211  This was not typical, however. Ordinarily,
in lieu of or in addition to such sweeping language, the legislative
thunderbolt was directed toward narrower, more specific offenses. The
" See PuB. STAT. CONN. (1824) 166; REv. STAT. DEL. (1829) 602 (Jan. 21,
1803) ; Ill. Laws 1819, p. 28; LAWS INDIANA TmPl. 1801-09 (ed. Philbrick) 354
(Sept. 17, 1807); Ind. Acts 1817-18, p. 294; 2 REv. LAws ME (1821) 768; 2
MASS. LAWS (1780-1807) 749 (Feb. 14, 1797); LAWS OF DIST. & TERn LA. and
TEPR. & STAT. Mo. (1842 ed.) 80 (July 9, 1806); id. 699 (Dec. 8, 1820); REv.
LAWs N. J. (1820) 408 (Feb. 6, 1799); LAWS OHIO (1820) 171; R. I. REv. LAWS
(1822) 410; 2 REv. CODE VA. (1819) 237 (Jan. 30, 1819) ; cf. 1 MD. LAWS 1692-
1839 (ed. Dorsey) 175 (hours of attendance at various seasons prescribed, May
1781); ComP. LAWS N. H. (1830) 181 (ferrymen to keep good boats, Feb. 28,
1783).
" See PuB. STAT. CONN. (1824) 166 (two boats required to be maintained at
Saybrook, Middletown, and New London); Pun. STAT. LAWS CONN. (1826) 493
(horse boat may be substituted at Saybrook if, in judgment of commissioners, it
affords service equivalent to two ferry boats) ; 1 LAws MD. 1692-1839 (ed. Dorsey)
251 (ferrymen licensed to cross Chesapeake Bay to have anchor, cable, and row-
boat aboard, Nov. 1788).206 See, e.g., Ill. Laws 1819, p. 104 (steam or animal power only to be used);
Ill. Laws 1824, p. 79 (license for horse ferry boat).
1*7 REv. STAT. DEL. (1829) 602 (Jan. 21, 1803) ; REV. LAWS N. J. (1820) 408
(Feb. 6, 1799); cf. 1 DIG. LA. AcTs (1804-27) 495 (Mar. 16, 1827); 1 LAws
TENN. 1820 (ed. Scott) 568 (April 20, 1796).
2081 N. C. REv. LAWS (1821) 234 (1767).
208 REv. STAT. Dm. (1829) 602 (Jan. 21, 1803); cf. LAWS OF DIsT. & TEM.
LA. and TEm & STATE Mo. (1842 ed.) 495 (penalty for wilful refusal by ferry-
man to carry passenger tendering lawful compensation, Jan. 13, 1817).
20 See, e.g., 2 REv. CODE VA. (1819) 241 (Jan. 20, 1819).
SPRINCE'S DiG. LAWS GA. (1819) 369 (Dec. 20, 1817).
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obstruction or injury of toll gates, toll bridges, and cross ways was for-
bidden, under penalty.212 So was the defacing or destruction of mile-
stones or guide posts. 213 Trespass to bridges by the removal of mate-
rials forming part of the structure was made subject to a fine.2 14 Im-
pairment of the navigation of harbors or interior waterways by casting
rubbish or ballast or by felling trees, into them, was prohibited ;216 and
the manner and conditions of grazing and herding livestock along the sea
coast were regulated by the state with a view to the preservation of
harbors.216 A penalty was imposed on the obstruction of wharves, with
the proviso that it should not apply to the deposit of merchandise to be
shipped, provided a sufficient passway were left clear.21 7  The removal
or destruction of beacons, buoys, and channel markers was capable of
occasioning very serious damage to navigation and corresponding severity
was shown in the legislation designed to curb it.218 Placing obstructions
on the towpaths of canals, or trespassing thereon with animals to the
potential hindrance of the navigation, was forbidden.
21 9
7. VEHICLES AND VESSELS
The physical facilities characteristic of a transportation enterprise
consist primarily of its fixed plant, the land or water channels over which
the traffic is to flow, and of the conveyances which are to accommodate
its freight or passenger load. The former represent financially much
the greater share of the investment and their predominance was reflected
in the correspondingly greater bulk of the legislative grist which dealt
with them and which has already been discussed in some detail; but
21I TouLmiN'S DIG. LAws ALA. (1823) 416 (toll bridges and cross ways, Dec.
15, 1821) ; PuB. STAT. CONN. (1824) 106 (destruction of toll gates and toll bridges
riotously or while disguised or at night); 2 Rzv. LAws ME. (1821) 601 (toll
gates) ; 3 MASS. LAWS (1780-1807) 285 (same, Mar. 16, 1805).
"I PuB. STAT. CONN. (1824) 424; 1 REv. LAWS Mz. (1821) 124; 2 Rzv. LAWS
ME. (1821) 526; LAWS OHIO (1820) 207; 3 PA. LAWS (1791-1802) 470 (Feb. 25,
1801) ; 4 PA. LAWS (1802-08) 7 (Feb. 11, 1803) ; id. 27 (Mar. 24, 1803) ; Coup.
LAWS VT. (1824) 161 (Nov. 3, 1815).
2 PUB. STAT. CONN. (1824) 424.
.1. PRINcE'S DIG. LAWS GA. (1819) 201 (April 7, 1763); REv. CODE MISS.
(1824) 361; CouP. LAWS N. H. (1830) 281 (June 16, 1792); 1 BREVARs's DIG.
Pus. STAT. LAws S. C. 414 (1726); 3 BREvARD's DIG. PuB. STAT. LAWS S. C. 254
(1785); 2 REv. CODE VA. (1819) 235 (1748); cf. 1 LAWS MD. 1692-1839 (ed.
Dorsey) 101 (placing earth or stone in Patapsco River or Baltimore harbor, Oct.
1753); 1 LAWS TENN. 1820 (ed. Scott) 569 (April 23, 1796); CoMp. LAWS VT.
(1824) 281 (Nov. 5, 1801).
215 1 MAss. LAWS (1780-1807) 328 (Cape Cod, June 26, 1786); 3 MAss. LAWS
(1780-1807) 30 (Wellfleet harbor, June 19, 1801) ; 3 REv. STAT. N. Y. (1827-28)
474 (Southampton Inlet, Nov. 23, 1824).
17 4 PA. LAWS (1802-08) 67 (Mar. 29, 1803).
21. PRI CE'S DIG. LAWS GA. (1819) 368 (Dec. 20, 1817); 1 LAWS MD. 1692-
1839 (ed. Dorsey) 657 (Dec. 1817); 1 N. C. Ray. LAWS (1821) 348 (beacons in
Currituck Inlet, 1777) ; 7 PA. LAWS 197 (Mar. 27, 1819) ; 1 BREVARD'S DIG. PUB.
STAT. LAWS S. C. 414 (1791); cf. R. I. Ray. LAWS (1822) 423 (fastening vessels
to or running them against buoys or stakes in navigable water penalized).
19 1 REv. STAT. N. Y. (1827-28) 246, 249; Ohio Sess. Acts, 1st Sess. 1826,
p. 47.
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legislation respecting the mobile facilities of transportation, the carriages
and watercraft in which goods or persons were carried, was not wholly
lacking. It is proposed here to note so much of that legislation as had
to do with (1) describing what persons or classes of persons might
possess or operate vehicles or vessels as carriers for hire and (2) estab-
lishing provisions as to the character and equipment of vehicles and
vessels.
Vehicular traffic was almost universally a free field for any one who
chose to engage in it, so far as the legislation of the period discloses.220
True, there were instances of municipal charters granting to local au-
thorities the power to regulate the licensing of cabs and drays221 or to
regulate wagons and carts 222 but probably the only operations affected
were those of vehicles employed within the area of the municipality and
its immediate environs. It seems unlikely that the resultant regulations
dealt, or had any occasion to deal, with vehicles crossing or in unbroken
connection with a carrying service which had crossed state lines in an
integrated course of transit, since very probably local services of the
character described were not as yet operated commonly by interstate
carriers.
That state abstention from legislation in this connection must be
attributed rather to the absence of felt need for it than to doubts as to
power seems to be the necessary conclusion from Perrin v. Sikes 23
There the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut affirmed a judgment
assessing a penalty for running a stage over part of a route compre-
hended in a legislative grant of an exclusive privilege to run a stage
"on the post road leading to Boston as far as the Massachusetts line"
and to carry passengers thereon. No constitutional objection apparently
occurred to court or counsel, for none was mentioned by either. What'
makes the silence on this score particularly significant is that the inter-,
state elements in the facts involved were not confined to the character
of the road. Additionally to this factor, both of the stage lines involved
were actually engaged in the business of interstate transportation. 224
Here, then, a state was taking charge of the issuance of a certificate of
convenience and necessity (to use a more modern expression) to an
"I0 But ef. PRINCE's DIG. LAWs GA. (1819) 580 (listing, in schedule of private
and local acts, twelve franchises for the operation of stage carriages) ; 8 PA. LAWS
(1822-25) 152 (all transportation over a railroad authorized to be built to be under
the direction of a person connected with the road, Mar. 31, 1823).
' See, e.g., Tou.MIN's DIG. LAvs ALA. (1823) 786 (Dec. 17, 1819).
.. See, e.g., 3 BREVARD'S DIG. PUB. STAT. LAWS S. C. 21 (1803) ; id. 27 (1791);
id. 36 (1783).5231 Day 19 (Conn. 1802).
Both lines ran from Hartford through Windsor and Suffield in Connecticut;
after that, as shown in the argument of counsel for plaintiff in error, 1 Day 21
(Conn. 1802), his client "had set up a stage to run to Westfield (Massachusetts)
and Albany (New York)" whereas the grant to defendant in error "contemplated
only a stage going to Boston."
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interstate common carrier for so much of the interstate journey as lay
within its limits; yet the matter was so far afield from what was under-
stood by "commerce between the States" that not even counsel who
were seeking reversal of the conviction raised any constitutional issue
as to the validity of the franchise.
Statutes against traveling the highways with naked scythes ex-
posed2 2 5 represent apparently a pioneer form of legislation on the equip-
ment of vehicles, another instance of which is to be found in legislation
reprobating the chaining of wheels of vehicles traveling along turnpikes
without providing an iron shoe under them.2 26  Ordinarily load weight
limitations were not made mandatory ;227 but substantially the same type
of regulation was involved in, and the same practical consequences were
perhaps expected from, provisions authorizing turnpikes to demand
multiple tolls of vehicles in excess of a designated weight whose wheel
construction did not satisfy legislatively prescribed standards 228 and
from vehicles loaded with blocks of marble and drawn by more than
five horses. 22 To implement such legislation, it was provided that
drivers might be required to give a true account of the weight of their
loads.23 0  Similar legislation was enacted by Congress as to the turnpike
roads whose construction it authorized within the District of Colum-
bia.23l Legislative prescription of the dimensions of vehicles using the
public highways also is traceable back to state activity in this period. 2 2
The equipment of vessels engaged in operating as carriers for hire on
interstate waters was occasionally specified in detail by a state.233  Small
boats used for landing passengers on, and taking them from, steamboats
were required to be equipped with oars and with a horn;2m4 and the
2 Ray. LAWS ME. (1821) 554.
2282 REv. LAWS ME. (1821) 605; 4 MAss. LAws (1807-16) 392 (Feb. 24,
,1814).
-11 But see 3 PA. LAWS (1791-1802) 82 (description and burden of carriages
authorized to travel over named turnpike in specified seasons, April 9, 1792); 4
PA. LAWS (1802-08) 27 (same, Mar. 4, 1803) ; id. 141 (same, Mar. 5, 1804); 2
REv. CODE VA. (1819) 216 (width of wheels and weight of load passing over
turnpikes prescribed, Feb. 7, 1817).
2282 REv. LAws ME. (1821) 604 (treble tolls for vehicles in excess of 4500
pounds gross weight whose fellies were less than three and a half inches wide) ;
4 MASS. LAWS (1807-16) 392 (same, Feb. 24, 1814); cf. 3 MAss. LAWS (1780-
1807) 285 (half tolls only from vehicles with fellies over six inches wide, Mar.
16, 1805) ; 1 REV. STAT. N. Y. (1827-28) 585 (graded reductions in tolls based on
increased width of wheels) ; 6 McCoRD STAT. AT LARGE S. C. 310 (reduction of
tolls for vehicles having tires four inches or more in width, Dec. 18, 1827).
21 4 PA. LAWS (1802-08) 319 (Mar. 17, 1806).
2302 REV. LAWS ME. (1821) 604; 4 MASS. LAWS (1807-16) 392 (Feb. 24,
1814) ; cf. 2 Ray. CODE VA. (1819) 217 (turnpike companies authorized to weigh
vehicles to determine legality of load, but not to delay vehicles, Feb. 7, 1817).
2 13 STAT. 5, 12 (1813).
'
2 See REv. LAWS N. J. (1820) 79 (minimum width for carriages fixed, May
30, 1787) ; 3 PA. LAWS (1791-1802) 82 (April 9, 1792).
222 See 2 Ray. CODE VA. (1819) 246 (boats on Potomac River, Dec. 9, 1793).
I2, 1 REv. STAT. N. Y. (1827-28) 684.
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equipment of boats using state constructed and maintained canals was
prescribed with considerable particularity.3 5  In addition to the not in-
frequent requirement of similar content as to vessels using canals and
improved navigable highways charging toll,23 6 there was early legisla-
tion in some states requiring every boat, having greater than a specified
draft, used on the rivers of the state, to have painted on the sternpost
the vessel's draft and her owner's name and residence.2 3 7
As a part of the general system of laws forbidding slaves to own
property, it was provided in some of the Southern states that slaves
might not own or possess boats2 8 and that, if they did, the boats kept or
claimed by them should be forfeit.
Vessels propelled by steam were as yet novel and in a measure ex-
perimental. Their introduction entailed considerable expense, with no
assurance of recoupment in the absence of experience as to the extent to
which their services would be employed. These considerations of heavy
initial investment and uncertain volume of shipper and passenger de-
mand were the same as those which underlay the grant of turnpike and
canal franchises to private corporations. In tempting private enterprise
to assume the outlay for internal improvements, the franchise device had
proven effective. In this analogous case of the introduction of a new
type of conveyance, it was natural that state legislatures, confident of
their jurisdiction over the subject of transportation facilities, should
recur to the familiar method of enlisting private investment. Accord-
ingly, in state after state, legislative licenses for the operation of steam-
boats were granted to speculative projectors.239 In a number of states,
the legislature did not stop with the mere grant of the privilege but
proceeded further to confer on the licensees the exclusive privilege of
using this method of navigation on the waters of the state2 40 or on cer-
tain of them particularly described by the statute.2 41 An especially in-
,35 See, e.g., 1 Rnv. STAT. N. Y. (1827-28) 160, 161 (setting shafts tipped with
metal forbidden; decked boats to have knife at bow to cut interfering tow rope).
280See 1 REv. STAT. N. Y. (1827-28) 240; 3 PA. LAWS (1791-1802) 311 (Feb.
27, 1798) ; 8 PA. LAWS (1822-25) 177 (April 1, 1823).
:17 1 BR VAI's DIG. Pun. STAT. LAWS S. C. 88 (1738).
" PmNcE's DIG. LAWS GA. (1819) 446 (May 10, 1770); 1 DIG. LA. Acrs
(1804-27) 110 (June 7, 1806); 2 BRavAnn's DIG. Pun. STAT. LAWS S. C. 238(1740).
",TouLMIn's DIG. LAWS ALA. (1823) 404 (steam ferry boat between Mobile
and Blakeley, Dec. 10, 1820); LAWS INDAIxA Toun. (ed. Ewbank & Piker) 144(Ohio River navigation, New York incorporators including Livingston, Fulton,
Clinton, Tompkins, and Roosevelt, Dec. 15, 1810) ; 5 Lrrr. (Ky.) 343 (Ohio River,
1816); La. Sess. Acts 1817, p. 198; 4 MAss. LAWS (1807-16) 237 (Merrimack
River, June 21, 1811).
2o PRrcx's DIG. LAWS GA. (1819) 49 (Dec. 19, 1817); La. Sess. Acts 1811,
p. 112 (grant to Livingston and Fulton).
:,11 DIG. LA. Acis (1804-27) 251 (coastal waters between a Gulf parish and
New Orleans, Feb. 16, 1821) ; id. 561 (Red River from Natchitoches to the upper
limit of the state) ; 2 DIG. LA. AcTs (1804-27) 532 (steam ferry boats in front of
New Orleans and suburbs, Feb. 7, 1827); 4 MAss. LAWS (1807-16) 448 (Con-
necticut River, Feb. 7, 1815) ; Mass. Sess. Laws, Jan. 1819, p. 98 (extending dura-
tion of preceding act).
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teresting variant of such legislation was that purporting to grant a
license for exclusive steam navigation between a port or landing in the
enacting state and a port or landing in another state.242 This steamboat
monopoly legislation occasioned almost the only retaliatory statutes en-
acted by the states in the early days of the nation's history and so pre-
sents a striking contrast with the prevalent reciprocity and co-ordination
of action which was found generally in connection with the development
of transportation facilities. Particularly where states were connected by
boundary waters, there was ill feeling. Sometimes a whole series of
statutes would result in response to continuing efforts to assure the
favored monopolists the use of the waters in question, 243 culminating in
provisions looking to prohibition of navigation by steam from the neigh-
boring to the enacting state.2 44
The only Congressional legislation on the subject of steamboats dealt
with the question of enrollment as a vessel of the United States, putting
resident aliens on a plane with citizens as far as the right to enroll ves-
sels engaged wholly in the interior rivers and bays of the United States
was concerned.2 45
8. SOME NoN-STATUTORY MISCELLANY
The major, indeed almost the exclusive, preoccupation of the discus-
sion to this point has been with the statutory materials, which alone
exist in ample abundance and variety to afford a systematic framework
for examining the prevalent understanding as to appropriate areas of
state and federal action and so to illustrate the received view of the con-
tent of the commerce clause. Random fragmentary materials of divers
sorts do exist, however, which corroborate the conclusions to be derived
from the statutes.
"I 1 BMARDvm's DIG. PUB. STAT. LAWS S. C. 88 (between Charleston and
Savannah, 1811).
"I Cf. REV. STAT. N. J. (1820) 547 (New Jersey citizen whose steamboat had
been condemned by New York authorities may seize and have forfeited to him
any New York steamboat he can find in New Jersey waters, subject to any rights
arising under United States patent laws, Jan. 25, 1811); id. 564 (further im-
plementation of judicial remedies available to aggrieved citizen, passed in response
to intermediately enacted New York legislation, Feb. 12, 1813) ; id. 689 (dam-
ages and treble costs recoverable by New Jersey citizens whose steamboat had
been condemned under New York statutes; and, if New York has enjoined his
operation of a steamboat in its waters, he may have steamboat transportation from
New York to New Jersey enjoined, Feb. 15, 1820) ; ComP. PuB. LAws N. J. (1833)
7 (declaring effect in New Jersey of New York judgments under steamboat mo-
nopoly laws, subjecting them to defense based on New Jersey statutes, Nov. 4,
1821) ; also Ohio Sess. Acts, 1st Sess. 1822, p. 29 (forbidding persons operating
under New York steamboat monopoly from navigating the waters of Ohio) ; Ohio
Sess. Acts, 2nd Sess. 1822, p. 5 (prohibiting New York citizens operating under the
New York steamboat monopoly from navigating Ohio waters on Lake Erie or
elsewhere, unless Ohio citizens were accorded equal privileges of navigation in
New York).
" See REV. LAWS N. J. (1820) 689 (authorizing injunction against steam
transportation from New York to New Jersey, Feb. 15, 1820) and the Ohio
•tatutes cited in the preceding note.2'2 STAT. 694 (1812).
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Superstatutory in character were the constitutions of the several
states. Revisions or amendments to the constitutions of the original thir-
teen when they dealt, as occasionally they did,246 with the provision of
transportation facilities indicated a concurrence of the delegates to the
constitutional convention and the public whose ratification was required
in the propriety of state activity in that connection. To these was
added, in the case of new states seeking admission, the authority of Con-
gress, whose approval of the proposed state constitution was requisite
to the state's admission. In two almost identical and nearly contempora-
neous provisions, 247 the establishment of an adequate system of land and
water communications was solemnly recognized as an obligation of the
states; and in one other,248 reference was made specifically to the navi-
gation of that conspicuously interstate waterway, the Mississippi River,
in terms apparently aimed at forestalling restrictions upon its navigation
which it was apprehended the state authorities might impose in the ab-
sence of constitutional restriction. 249
The debates in Congress as well as the laws it adopts reveal the no-
tions of the lawmakers.2 50 Mention has already been made of this source
in connection with the subject of interstate telegraph lines ;251 and it will
be recalled that provision of interstate telegraph lines was analogized to
action under the postal power, with no allusion to the commerce power.
A similar approach was consistently manifested whenever the pro-
vision of other interstate transportation facilities presented itself for
consideration.
Congress was importuned to provide or to assist in the provision of
both land routes and waterways, particularly in instances where an espe-
cially large scale project was contemplated. Once indeed in connection
with the Military Road through the southwestern Indian country, now
2"' See GA. CONST. (1798) Art. 1, §26; N. Y. CONST. (1821) Art. VII, §10.
217 ALA. CONST. (1819) Art. VI, §21 ("The general assembly shall make pro-
visions by law for obtaining correct knowledge of the several objects proper for
improvement in relation to the navigable waters, and to the roads in this state,
and for making a systematic and economical application of the means appropriated
to those objects") ; Mo. CONST. (1820) Art. VII ("Internal improvement shall
forever be encouraged by the government of this State, and it shall be the duty of
the general assembly, as soon as may be, to make provision by law for ascertain-
ing the most proper objects of improvement in relation both to roads and navigable
waters; and it shall also be their duty to provide by law for a systematic and
economical application of the funds appropriated to those objects").
"'TENN. CoNsT. (1796) Art. XI, §29 ("That an equal participation of the
free navigation of the Mississippi is one of the inherent rights of the citizens of
this state; it cannot, therefore, be conceded to any prince, potentate, power, person,
or persons whatever").
2" On the maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express limitation
of action as regards the Mississippi may arguably be regarded as a recognition
of state power to restrict navigation of the Tennessee, the Cumberland, and other
navigable interstate waterways located in part in Tennessee.
'"' Comparable materials for the state legislatures were, regrettably, as un-
available for 1790-1825 as they are for 1946.2" See page 000 supra.
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Alabama and Mississippi, attention was directed to the commercial im-
portance of the proposed road ;252 again, in the discussion of federal
subscription to the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal, the suggestion was
even ventured that the commerce clause might afford a basis for federal
action.2 53 In the first case, however, which involved a segment of road
wholly outside the limits of any state, the argument was clearly directed
to the issue of policy, not to that of power; and, in the second, the senator
urging it hastened to disclaim an intention to rely on this radical and
venturesome proposition as the true source of federal power. Nor does
either of the two instances2 54 where language was used, reminiscent of
the original latitudinarian Randolph draft of the Constitution,2 5  regard-
ing the incompetence of the states to undertake the provision of a com-
munications system, seem to have had other than a hortatory purpose.
The provision of lighthouses, it is true, was accepted almost from
the beginning of the Union as a matter of Congressional cognizance
under the commerce power2 56 and so, after initial grave doubts,25 7 was
1114 ANNALS OF CONG. 1185, 1186 (1882) (noting, in connection with a dis-
cussion in the House 9f Representatives, on February 7, 1805, that "Mr. G. W.
Campbell observed that.. . the second object for which we wish this road opened,
viz. for commercial purposes, is still more important to our citizens (than improved
postal facilities) ; and is essential for the prosperity of our country. The only
mode by which the people of that country can, at this time, convey their produce
to market, is by boating it down the river Tennessee into the Ohio, then along
that to the Mississippi, and down that river to New Orleans. Our boatmen em-
ployed in this trade are obliged to return by land, as the same boats that carry
produce down those rivers, cannot ascend them, and there is but little navigation
yet, in boats of any kind, up those waters into the State of Tennessee .... The
only route by which those boatmen can now return from New Orleans, is that
already stated, on which the mail is conveyed, being between four and five hundred
miles more than they would have to travel by the proposed route .... It is there-
fore hoped that this House will feel disposed to encourage the farming interests
of our infant country by removing those obstacles to its progress that the State
authority is incompetent to effect, and that prove so materially injurious to the
interests of our citizens").
2 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 59 (1882) (remarks of Bayard in the Senate on Feb-
ruary 7, 1807: ". . . It has never been contended that no power exists which has
not been expressly delegated ... (but) Having a power to provide for the safety
of commerce and the defence of the nation, we may fairly infer a power to cut a
canal a measure unquestionably proper with a view of either object . ).
255 ANNALS OF CONG. 314 (1882) (Baldwin in the House of Representatives,
February 11, 1796) ; 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 1186 (1882) (Campbell, in the House,
February 7, 1805).
25 For an account of this draft and its fate in the Convention of 1787, see Abel,
supra note 6, at 433-436.
251 ANNALS OF CONG. 176 (1882) (Madison in House of Representatives,
April 21, 1789); 2 id. 1917 (Jackson of Georgia, arguvndo, in House of Repre-
sentatives, Feb. 4, 1791); cf. 11 id. 1124 (Giles of Virginia, arguendo, in House
of Representatives, Mar. 31, 1802).
"" See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1450 (1882) (where a proposal, on Mar. 15, 1790,
to include in the appropriation bill a sum "for removing the wrecks and obstruc-
tions in Savannah river, from that city to the sea" was objected to "as involving
a principle pregnant with innumerable difficulties. . . . Should this be granted,
every member in this House will come forward with proposals for clearing rivers
and opening canals to the sources of rivers," the proponent replying "that the
principle is already established in the bill by the provision made for Delaware
river. He said that the revenue of the United States is to be derived from navi-
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the matter of harbor improvements used and useful in connection with
foreign commerce;258 but, aside from facilities peculiar to maritime
enterprise, no measure contemplating Congressional action for the pro-
vision of, or in aid of, transportation facilities was rested upon the
commerce power. Indeed, aside from the scattered instances noted
above, that power was not mentioned as even a makeweight argument.
The silence did not flow from a lack of occasion to advance the claim.
Land transportation routes first attracted the attention of Congress and
early steps were taken to provide extensive interstate systems, at first,
however, grounded explicitly and exclusively upon the granted power
over post roads, 259 to which, starting with the proposal for the Cumber-
land road, the Congressional power over the disposition of the property
of the United States260 was later joined as a source of authority.261
The question of federal participation in interstate waterway projects,
such as canal and navigation improvement enterprises, did not arise until
after land routes had been considered; but, when it did arise, the pat-
tern of thought and discussion was comparable in its avoidance of reli-
ance on the commerce power. The first notable discussion called in
question the very power of Congress to authorize a structure in the bed
of the Potomac within the limits of the District of Columbia. While
the determination was recognized as fraught with important conse-
quences for upstream shippers by virtue of its potential effect on the
gation and commerce; excepting the obstructions in our rivers and harbors are
removed, commerce will be embarrassed and our revenue will be lessened and
destroyed"; following this argument, the proposal was voted down by the House,
whether upon the constitutional grounds mentioned in the discussion or for other
reasons not mentioned it is of course impossible to know).
258 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 1203 (1882) (resolution to investigate "what further
measures are necessary to secure, protect, and preserve the vessels of the United
States in their entrance to any of the ports of the United States," arising out of
discussion of propriety of Congressional upkeep of piers in Delaware River re-
ferred, on April 27, 1796, to Committee of Commerce and Manufactures of House
of Representatives) ; see 2 id. 1917 (remarks of Jackson of Georgia in House of
Representatives on Feb. 4, 1791).
"1 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 1063 (1882) (motion in House of Representatives on
Jan. 7, 1795, by Fitzsimons of Pennsylvania, a delegate to the Constitutional Con-
vention in 1787, to apply postal surplus "for the making of a Post Road . . .be-
tween the Southern and Eastern States") ; id. 1083 (motion referred to committee);
5 id. 314 (motion in House of Representatives by Madison to survey "the shortest
route between Portland, Maine, and Georgia" as a post road, supported by Baldwin
of Georgia, a delegate to the Constitutional Convention in 1787) ; see 14 id. 1185,
1186 (mention of postal power and others by Campbell of Tennessee in House of
Representatives in discussing southwestern Military Road on Feb. 7, 1805); cf.
3 id. 303 (Jan. 3, 1792).
"o U. S. CONST. ART. IV, §3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have power to dispose
of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other
property belonging to the United States. .. .")
"Cf. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 1125 (1882) (Cumberland Road, Giles of Virginia
in House of Representatives, Mar. 31, 1802) ; 19 id. 1170 (Jan. 24, 1809) ; id. 1559(remarks of Stanford in House of Representatives, Mar. 3, 1809, speaking of the
Cumberland road as "having commenced with the proceeds of the public lands").
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navigability of the river,26 2 not a syllable was breathed suggesting the
existence of Congressional power under the commerce clause. Instead
the terms of the acts of cession by Virginia and Maryland and the con-
stitutional grant of exclusive jurisdiction over the District 2 3 were ex-
tensively discussed 264 and the bill passed accordingly 2 5 as an exercise
of the special Congressional powers over the District. In the next in-
stance involving waterways, Bayard's allusion to the commerce clause
has already been noted ;266 but he made parallel reference to the Con-
gressional power respecting national defense and then expressly aban-
doned both suggestions, stating as the true basis of federal action in the
premises the grant of authority over the property of the United States
2 7
and leaving his commerce and defense remarks to stand as senatorial
obiter dicta. Without further reported discussion, the grant of public
lands to the Canal proprietors was approved in the Senate some two
years later.2 68 When it came for consideration to the House, March 3,
1809, objection was made that a grave constitutional question was pre-
sented which should not be summarily disposed of at the end of -the
life of the House; proponents replied that the constitutional issues had
been settled at the time of the Cumberlhnd Road act and called attention
to two Congressional powers-that over the property of the United
States and that over national defense-as a basis for federal authority26 0
but made no mention whatever of the commerce power. The bill was
postponed indefinitely, the reasons of course not appearing.
It will thus be observed that, in the course of their deliberations on the
provision of transportation facilities by land or by water, congressmen
advanced a great variety of constitutional grants to support federal
power to act, notably the grants of power over post roads, over the
property of the United States, and over the District of Columbia, while
commerce and the national defense were mentioned only occasionally
and more or less as afterthoughts without great stress placed on them.
"112 ANNALS OF CONG. 795 (1882) (noting that in the discussion, in the House
of Representatives on December 11, 1804, "Mr. Lewis . . . felt particularly solic-
itous for the erection of this dam, as it regards the interests of the citizens in the
western parts of the States of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania; for if no
steps are taken to improve the navigation below Georgetown, the navigation will
soon become so shallow as not to permit sea-vessels to come to Georgetown to
carry off the produce which may descend by the Potomac and its improved canals.
The destruction of Georgetown will follow the loss of the navigation and the
western farmers will lose a choice of two rival markets").
" U. S. CoxsT. ART. I, §8 ("The Congress shall have power... 17. To exercise
exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district (not exceeding ten
miles square) as may, by cession of particular States and the acceptance of Con-
gress, become the seat of Government of the United States . .
21, 14. ANNALS OF CoNG. 711-721 (1882); id. 791-807.
"
5Id. at 811 (Dec. 13, 1804).
211 Supra note 253.
21T16 ANNALS OF CONG. 59 (1882) (Bayard in the Senate, Feb. 7, 1807).
" 19 ANNALS OF CONG. 341 (1882) (Feb. 3, 1809).
2'9 Id. at 1558, 1559.
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Confirmation of the conclusion that Congress did not regard the matter
as involving commerce regulation is found in the disposition made of
portions of Jefferson's presidential message of November 1808. Parts
of it had related to furthering domestic manufactures, other parts to
disposing of surplus revenues to aid in the improvement of roads, canals,
and rivers, for which the President thought a constitutional amendment
requisite. The former were referred by the House to its Committee on
Commerce and Manufactures but the latter were not; instead they were
referred to a select committee2 70 and, in like manner, specific petitions
for federal transportation in land and water transportation projects were
referred not to the standing Committee on Commerce and Manufactures
but to a select committee,271 a procedure inconsistent with the supposi-
tion that the matters were regarded as coming within the purview of the
standing committee.
The evidences thus disclose serious Congressional doubt as to the
existence and source of federal authority relative to transportation facil-
ities; conversely they show very little doubt of the existence of state
power. One early and rather obscure instance there is, indeed, of adjoin-
ing states petitioning for Congressional authorization "to open an in-
ternal navigation between those states"2 72 but it is probable that the need
for Congressional assent to imposition of a tonnage tax in turn needed
for financing the project was at the bottom of the request. 273 But there
is no uncertainty in the vigorous assertion by a member of the House
that
The States have jurisdiction over all the navigable waters within
their bounds; and where two States are separated by a river or bay,
it would then be easy for a negotiation between those two States to
provide security to their citizens from injury on such waters. Let
not the General Government intermeddle with the States' policy.2 7 4
This postulate-of the plenitude of state power over the waterways was
never more clearly disclosed than in the discussions incident to the estab-
lishment of the permanent seat of government, in the first session of
the first Congress. A possibility then existing that it might be located
upstream on an interstate river running through Pennsylvania and
Maryland, there was general agreement that the consent of those states
was necessary and should be obtained from their legislatures before ob-
2 70 Id. at 483.
'7 Id. at 485 (involving grant of lands to Catawba and Wateree River Naviga-
tion Company) and at 1170 (involving federal subscription to Susquehanna and
Tioga Turnpike Road Company).
I22 ANNALS OF CONG. 718 (1882) (Virginia and North Carolina, Aug. 5,
1790. "Considerable debate ensued respecting the propriety of Congress interfer-
ing in a business of this kind; a committee was appointed to bring in a bill...").
'" This seems to have been the canal project provided for in 1 N. C. Rav.
LAWs (1821) 635 (1790) which may be consulted for the financial arrangements.
"16 ANNALS OF CONG. 1734 (1882) (Dec. 29, 1796).
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structions to the navigation could be removed, even at federal expense.27 5
As to land routes also the sentiment found expression that, even though
there might be a proper head of Congressional power under which the
Federal Government could act, as, for instance, that over property of the
United States, nevertheless no road could be laid out by virtue of it
until the states through which it would run should give their consent.270
The competence of the states and the incompetence of Congress to deal
with such matters as "what weights shall be carried on ... roads and at
what seasons of year," the establishment of ferries, and the grant of
stage monopolies were stated in debate as if they were fixed datum
posts too clear for any to dispute.2 17
The executive, it would seem, was in full accord with the views enter-
tained by the legislators. In view of Jefferson's traditional role as an
apostle of strict construction, it is perhaps no surprise that his presi-
dential recommendations to consider devoting federal funds to the estab-
lishment of transportation facilities in the way of roads, canals, and river
navigation should postulate a lack of constitutional power to take action
for that purpose and the need of a constitutional amendment as a basis
of authority.27 8 No one, however, can suppose Hamilton to have been
unfriendly to an extended interpretation of federal authority; yet he,
too, in his celebrated Report on Manufactures, made by him as Wash-
ington's Secretary of the Treasury, seriously questioned the power of
the United States under its constitutional grants to pursue the desirable
objective of providing a transportation plant.2 7 9 Clear indeed must have
Il 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 895, 896 (1882) (note particularly the remarks of
Madison, Sept. 17, 1789, that "it is possible the State of Pennsylvania may refuse
her concurrence; this would defeat our object, if the practicability was ever so
certain; it is certainly prudent in the United States to guard against such a con-
tingency. If Pennsylvania will agree, we do no injury to her by making it a con-
dition; if she would not agree, would it not argue a great inattention and want of
prudence in us to put our best interest so much in her power?").
"1 15 ANNALS OF CONG. 836 (1882) (Leib discussing Cumberland Road bill in
the House of Representatives).
2"3 ANNALS oF CONG. 303-311 (1882) (Gerry, however, maintained that the
state grants of stage coach monopolies were avoided by adoption of the Constitu-
tion although not contesting the other instances, debate in the House of Represent-
atives, Jan. 3 and Jan. 5, 1792).
17814 ANNALS OF CONG. 78 (1882) (second inaugural address) ; 16 id. 14, 15
(express declaration of lack of constitutional power) ; 19 id. 15.
11" 5 ANNALS or CONG. 1015, 1016 ("XI. The facilitating of the transportation
of commodities. Improvements favoring this object intimately concern all the
domestic interests of a community; but they may, without impropriety, be men-
tioned as having an important relation to manufactures. There is perhaps, scarcely
anything which has been better calculated to assist the manufactures of Great
Britain than the ameliorations of the public roads of that Kingdom and the great
progress which has been of late made in opening canals. Of the former the United
States stand much in need, for they present uncommon facilities. The symptoms
of attention to the improvement of inland navigation, which have lately appeared
in some quarters, must fill with pleasure every breast warmed with a true zeal for
the prosperity of the country. These examples, it is to be hoped, will stimulate
the exertions of the Government and citizens of every State. There can certainly
be no object more worthy of the cares of the local administrations; and it were
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been the consensus for these two distinguished protagonists of .opposing
views on most matters governmental and constitutional to have enter-
tained such harmonious opinions in this connection.
The judiciary had little occasion to pronounce its views on the mat-
ter before Marshall's landmark opinion. Of the scattering of com-
merce clause cases280 prior to the controversy in Gibbons v. Ogden, only
two had to do with issues affecting transportation facilities. The earlier
of these, Livingston v. Van. Ingen,28 1 was a precursor of Gibbons v.
Ogden in the sense that it involved a determination of the validity of the
New York steamboat monopoly. The statute was sustained but the cir-
cumstances that the contemplated operation of the unlicensed vessel was
between New York City and Albany, wholly in New York waters, and
that there was no showing of any federal coasting license afford a clear
basis for distinguishing the cases. However, in its assigned grounds of
decision, the earlier opinion is clearly repugnant to the later authori-
tative pronouncement. At the trial the chancellor had refused to enjoin
the operation of the unlicensed steamboat on the grounds that the grant
of a monopoly invalidly infringed the common right of the people of
New York in the waters of the state and the further ground of the
priviliges and immunities clause of the federal Constitution; the com-
merce clause was quoted but not discussed and the chancellor concluded
that the state had an "unquestioned" right of "appropriating, regulating,
and improving the navigable waters of the state of every description
for public beneficial purposes, as for accommodation of commerce or
navigation." 282  On appeal, counsel for both parties, comprising some
of the then most eminent members of the New York bar,283 while they
did not neglect to argue the commerce regulation issue, devoted vastly
the greater share of their attention to the proposition of the state's power
in view of the constitutional clause authorizing Congress to grant pat-
ents for inventions.2 8 4  The judges likewise were not especially im-
to be wished that there was no doubt of the power of the National Government to
lend its direct aid, on a comprehensive plan. This is one of those improvements
which could be prosecuted with more efficacy by the whole, than by any part or
parts of the Union. There are cases in which the general interest will be in
danger to be sacrificed to the collision of some supposed local interests ...
Specimens of a spirit similar to that which governed the countries here spoken of,
present themselves too frequently to the eye of an impartial observer, and render
it a wish of patriotism that the body in this country, in whose councils a local or
partial spirit is least likely to predominate, were at liberty to pursue and promote
the general interest, in those instances in which there might be danger of the
interference of such a spirit.").2
"Supra note 5.
" 9 Johns. 507 (N. Y. 1812).282 Id. at 516.
"' For appellant, Hoffman, Colden, Riggs, and Emmet; for appellee, Wells,
Henry, and Van Vechten.28, As abstracted in the report, the allocation of space between the commerce
clause and the patent issues is, in the case of appellant, in the ratio of approximately
one to five, in the case of appellee in the ratio of approximately one to six.
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pressed by the thought that there was an unauthorized regulation of
commerce. Only the opinions of Justice Thompson 85 and Chancellor
Kent gave extended consideration to the commerce clause argument.
The former, while expressing the view that if commerce were involved
at all it was only internal commerce within the state as to which New
York was free to act, further unequivocally declared:
To deny to the legislature this right would be at once striking
from our statute books grants almost innumerable of a similar
nature; all our turnpike roads, tollbridges, canals, ferries, and the
like, more or less concern commerce or the intercourse between
different parts of the state and must depend on the same prin-
ciples with the privileges granted to the appellants. The truth, how-
ever, is that none of them relate to commerce within the sense and
meaning of the term as used in the constitution; they are mere
municipal regulations with which congress can have no concern. 280
Kent was similarly inclined to take it as axiomatic that the trunpike,
canal, ferry, and like legislation was well within the state's capacity ;287
the Hudson River, he thought, was subject to unrestrained regulation by
New York288 which might even forbid the entry in that stream of steam
vessels from abroad engaged in foreign commerce. 280 He called atten-
tion to the fact that the steamboat legislation had its inception in the
administration of, and met the approval of, John Jay, later the first
Chief Justice and ever careful on constitutional points.290 In "the uni-
form practical construction of this [the commerce] power" he found the
test of its limits and briefly listed the varied content of state legislation
in connections conceivably bearing on commerce to indicate the range
of objects which it was intended to leave with the states and not to
convey to the Federal Government through the commerce power.201
In State v. New Orleans Navigation Company,292 Louisiana unsuc-
cessfully called in question through a scire facias proceeding, the author-
ity of a chartered navigation improvement company to levy tolls, as
"I Smith Thompson, later Justice of the United States Supreme Court to which
he was appointed Dec. 9, 1823, and took the oath Feb. 10, 1824, not participating
in any cases argued before that time. Such cases included Gibbons v. Ogden,
argued Feb. 4-6, 1824. In view of Mr. Justice Thompson's relative independence
of the dominance exercised by Chief Justice Marshall, as shown, e.g., by his dis-
senting in Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (U. S. 1827), it is interesting to
speculate whether Gibbons v. Ogden had a unanimous court behind it at the time
of rendition.
- 9 Johns. 507, 568 (N. Y. 1812). Italics supplied.
287 Id. at 580.
211 Id. at 579 ('"Hudson river is the property of the people of this state, and
the legislature have the same jurisdiction over it that they have over the land or
over any of our public highways, or over the waters of any of our rivers or lakes.
They may in their sound discretion regulate and control, enlarge or abridge the use
of its waters ... ).282 Id. at 580. 200 Id. at 573.
2 1 Id. at 580. 292 11 Mart. 309 (La. 1822).
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authorized by state statute, for passage along improved waterways on
which, both before and after the improvements, vessels engaged in both
interstate and foreign commerce were borne. The real constitutional
battle raged over whether an unauthorized tonnage tax was being
charged; but the commerce regulation issue was briefly argued 293 by
counsel and briefly disposed of by the court. In a repeated course of
state legislation approved by Congress, judge Martin, speaking for the
court, found
conclusive evidence of the early, deliberate and continued opinion
of the national legislature and of that of many of the most im-
portant members of the union . . . that the navigation of water-
courses may be improved, and the necessary funds procured or
reimbursed by a duty raised on vessels navigating it, commensurate
with the object, with the assent of congress, without violating any
of the parts of the constitution of the united states.294
In the instant case Congressional assent did not appear; but, having re-
gard to the intimations of constitutional propriety thus believed to be
deducible from legislative practice, the statute (and with it the toll)
was given a clean constitutional bill of health. Special attention is called
to the approach of both the New York and the Louisiana courts in
turning to the established legislative practice as affording the precedents
helpful in this constitutional interpretation.
As to land travel and the provision of facilities therefor, there are
no holdings except the disposition sub silentio in Perrin v. Sikes. The
references to the subject arguendo295 by appellant's counsel in Living-
stow v. Van Ingen assume that the status of state legislation in that con-
nection is too secure to be disputed and that it possesses value as an
intrinsically unassailable exercise of state power, of great persuasive
force as an analogy; and Chancellor Kent, listing from "the code of our
statute laws (o)ur turnpike roads, our tollbridges, the exclusive grant
to run stage-waggons" appears to regard these, although "affecting as
well the intercourse between citizens of this and other states as between
our own citizens"29 6 to be so plainly within state cognizance unimpaired
by radiations from the commerce clause that no lawyer would dream of
attacking them. Indeed that must have been the case in order for the
silence of court and counsel in Perrin v. Sikes to be at all intelligible.
Received professional opinion of bench and bar alike seemingly was that
the subject of transportation facilities on land-even more than water-
""Out of approximately sixty-three pages of reported argument, the state's
attorney devoted approximately one page to the commerce regulation issue; out
of some eighty-six pages of oral argument by the company's attorney, approxi-
mately two thirds of a page dealt with that issue.
11 Mart. 309, 318 (La. 1822). Italics in original opinion.
See 9 Johns. 528 (N. Y. 1812).298 Id. at 580.
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ways-was beyond question a matter remaining within state power;
while, even as to the weaker case of waterways, the control of the states
was clear enough to be sustained by both of the two courts to which it
was presented, each of which, by strange coincidence, happened cur-
rently to be headed by an exceptionally strong and able judge.
Finally, the legal treatises of the day remain to be examined. Oddly
enough, of the two then extant on constitutional law, one297 does not
mention interstate commerce, except in quoting the text of the Constitu-
tion, confining its whole discussion of the commerce clause to issues of
foreign commerce and commerce with the Indian tribes29 83-surely a
speaking silence. The other, Sergeant on Constitutional Law, the first
full scale work dealing exclusively with the American constitution, pub-
lished at Philadelphia in 1822, affirms, on the authority of Livingston v.
Van Ingen "the power of a state to grant an exclusive privilege ...
for the navigation of steam boats in its waters" and, without citation of
authority, declares that "the navigable waters within the territory of a
State are subject to its municipal regulations and the State may regulate
their use, in the same manner as it makes laws respecting turnpike roads,
toll bridges, canals [and] ferries .. ."209 The power of the Federal
Government to provide internal improvements is recognized with pri-
mary attribution to the granted power respecting post roads,300 to some
extent re-enforced by half-a-dozen other powers dismissed with a serial
listing, among which the commerce power appears. The doctrinal writ-
ing of the time is thus seen to have been in full accord with officials in
all branches and levels of government in concluding that the states
possessed full regulatory power over all the facilities of interstate trans-
portation, undisturbed by anything in the federal commerce power,
which was taken to have at most a casual relevance in the field.
9. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The tale is told. It is a tale which is singularly coherent. The action
of the legislatures, state and federal, the language of courts, textwriters,
executive officials, counsel at the bar, and congressmen on the floor of
the House testify to a common understanding of the respective spheres
for state and federal action in relation to the interstate channels of land
and water communication.
The decades before Gibbons v. Ogden were a time neither of legis-
lative inaction nor of constitutional confusion. There is a too prevalent
tendency to believe that that case was the first because primitive con-
ditions and want of concern with interstate carriage before that time
29? 1 TucER!'s BLACKSTONE, APPENDIX (1803).
208 The discussion is to be found at pp. 247-253 inclusive.




dispensed with any considerable degree of activity and hence with any
occasion for passing on what we have since come to regard as commerce
clause issues. This review of a part of the legislation of that remote
time should at least dispel that notion. The matter was not presented
sooner because, almost without exception, Marshall's contemporaries in
the infancy of the republic did not regard the questions involved as
presenting commerce clause issues.
There was throughout a vigorous proliferation of action by the state
governments-establishment of highways, of canals, of navigable water-
courses, of telegraph systems and railroads, control of harbors and
coastal rivers, of vessels and vehicles, of conditions of the highway, of
equipment and weight loads of vehicle. It will be remembered that the
instances cited have in large part been selected because they peculiarly
and in some cases expressly impinged on interstate intercourse. Where
conflicting interests of the states pressed for co-ordination, the situation
was recognized and was cared for by conjoint action of the states
affected or otherwise.
Over these same matters, Congress exercised appropriate jurisdic-
tion as a territorial legislature for the District of Columbia, imitating
and thus approving the usual types of state legislation. Beyond that,
it undertook improvements by virtue of authority over the post roads
and over the property of the United States. But in doing so it was
scrupulous to obtain the consent of the states to works within their
borders while they, on the other had, boldly maintained their inde-
pendence of action and their right to control except as limited in special
cases; e.g., by the need of Congressional consent to tonnage taxes. For
lighthouses and to a degree for harbor improvement, the commerce
clause was thought to confer authority on Congress; but beyond that,
none.
This is a story of a constitutional system that is dead. Perhaps
(although it did function to the apparent satisfaction of those affected)
it might not function today. Before Gibbons v. Ogden, there was regu-
lation of interstate transportation facilities in nearly as great variety and
profusion as there is now; but it was not properly commerce regulation
because that subject was not really commerce until Chief Justice Mar-
shall made it so. With the three words, "commerce is intercourse"3 0'
more than three decades of highly elaborated developments of controls
of the media of land and water transportation, representing the consti-
tutional understanding of the early federal era, entered the long path to
oblivion.
3O1 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. at 189 (U. S. 1824).
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